Shifting Priorities? Civic Identity in the Jewish State and the Changing Landscape of Israeli Constitutionalism by Batal, Mohamad
Claremont Colleges
Scholarship @ Claremont
CMC Senior Theses CMC Student Scholarship
2018
Shifting Priorities? Civic Identity in the Jewish State
and the Changing Landscape of Israeli
Constitutionalism
Mohamad Batal
This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in this collection by an authorized
administrator. For more information, please contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.
Recommended Citation
Batal, Mohamad, "Shifting Priorities? Civic Identity in the Jewish State and the Changing Landscape of Israeli Constitutionalism"
(2018). CMC Senior Theses. 1826.
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1826
 
 
Claremont McKenna College 
 
 
 
Shifting Priorities? Civic Identity in the Jewish State and 
the Changing Landscape of Israeli Constitutionalism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted To 
Professor George Thomas 
 
 
by 
Mohamad Batal 
 
 
for 
Senior Thesis 
Spring 2018 
April 23, 2018 
ii 
 
 
  
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
Abstract:  
 
This thesis begins with an explanation of Israel’s foundational constitutional 
tension—namely, that its identity as a Jewish State often conflicts with liberal-
democratic principles to which it is also committed. From here, I attempt to 
sketch the evolution of the state’s constitutional principles, pointing to Chief 
Justice Barak’s “constitutional revolution” as a critical juncture where the 
aforementioned theoretical tension manifested in practice, resulting in what I call 
illiberal or undemocratic “moments.” More profoundly, by introducing Israel’s 
constitutional tension into the public sphere, the Barak Court’s jurisprudence 
forced all of the Israeli polity to confront it. My next chapter utilizes the 
framework of a bill currently making its way through the Knesset—Basic Law: 
Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People—in order to draw out the past and 
future of Israeli civic identity. From a positivist perspective, much of my thesis 
points to why and how Israel often falls short of liberal-democratic principles. My 
final chapters demonstrate that neither the Supreme Court nor any other part of 
the Israeli polity appears particularly well-suited to stopping what I see as the 
beginning of a transformational shift in theory and in practice. In my view, this 
shift is making, and will continue to make, the state’s ethno-religious character 
the preeminent factor in Israeli Constitutionalism and civic identity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 The list of people I would like to thank is much longer than this one, and 
what I would like to say to them is far more intimate. However, I will give it a 
shot. First and foremost, I would like to thank my formal reader, Professor 
George Thomas, as well as my informal reader, Professor Gary Gilbert, for taking 
the time to provide me with one of the most enriching educational experiences of 
my life. I should emphasize that Professor Thomas has long had this sort of 
impact on my academic career, and I am deeply indebted to him for that. 
Additionally, I would not be here without the never-ending encouragement I 
received from my family, my dear friend and mentor Jessica Block, as well as 
Sean Cheng, who always believed in the power of exponential functions. Lastly, I 
would like to credit Professor Ilai Saltzman, Professor Gary Jacobsohn, Eli 
Etzioni, Connor Bowen, Kaamil Hussain, Campbell Streator, Carly Medina, Wael 
Batal, Melissa Muller, and Susan Layden for their invaluable advice and support 
throughout the process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ix 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction: The Fundamental Tension in Israeli 
Constitutionalism 
1 
  
Chapter 1: Barak’s “Constitutional Revolution” and the Tug-of-
War over Foundational Principles 
12 
     A. Tracing Israel’s Constitutional Evolution 13 
    B. Brief Note on Illiberal and Undemocratic Moments 23 
  
Chapter 2: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People                                  25 
   A. History of the Proposed Basic Law 25 
   B. American Group Rights, Israel’s Brand of Pluralism, and Civic 
Identities 
33 
   C. Back to the Bill 45 
  
Chapter 3: Between Judges, Politicians, and the People—
Structural Barriers to Judicial Activism                                                                                            
57 
   A. The Changing Politics of Appointments and the Move Towards 
Restraint 
58 
   B. Judicial Activism and Social Change in Rifted Democracies 71 
  
Chapter 4: Examining the Evidence for Judicial Restraint                                  80 
   A. State-Sanctioned Discrimination and Segregation in the Allocation 
of Land 
80 
   B. Briefly Broadening the Discussion 96 
  
Conclusion: A Transformational Shift? It Could Be 99 
  
Works Cited                                                                                                                          107
x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction: The Fundamental Tension in Israeli Constitutionalism 
“The vagueness of the reference to ‘Israel's heritage’ was deliberate, with the 
result that different judges could interpret the Jewish tradition in different ways, 
religious and secular, liberal and communitarian. The provision demonstrates the 
dominance of Jewish culture in the Israeli polity, of the unity between the 
‘political center’ and one of the communities it incorporates; but its meaning is 
ultimately deferred for subsequent judicial interpretation.”1 
- Gary Jeffery Jacobsohn, Apple of Gold 
 
 
With regard to its constitutional foundations, Israel is an enigma. What I 
mean by this can be made clear by a comparison to the American constitutional 
scheme. While the latter is practically defined by conflict—as Madison put it, 
“Ambition must be made to counteract ambition”2—the differences between 
Republicans and Democrats, conservatives and liberals, Federalists and 
Antifederalists ultimately fall within what Gary Jacobsohn calls “a broader 
consensus of agreement on political fundamentals.”3 It is precisely this sort of 
consensus that remains elusive in Israeli Constitutionalism. Students of 
comparative constitutionalism have often asked if Israel can maintain its 
commitment to being a Jewish state while consistently upholding liberal 
democratic principles.4 In attempting to answer this question, we should first 
                                               
1 Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, Apple of Gold: Constitutionalism in Israel and the United States 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), [53-54]. 
2 James Madison, Federalist No. 51, ed. Charles R. Kessler and Clinton Rossiter (New York City, 
NY: Signet, 2003) 
3  Jacobsohn, Apple of Gold, [115]. 
4 In Constitutional Identity, Jacobsohn offers a different version of this question: “Most conflict 
in Israeli society runs along a definitional fault line emphasizing one fundamental question: Is the 
essential character of the state comprehensible mainly as the embodiment of democratic—
basically Western—attributes, or as the fulfillment of the national ambitions of a particular 
people?” See Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, Constitutional Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2010), [272]. 
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look to the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel,5 which, much 
like its American counterpart, is best understood as an attempt to affix a certain 
“political-moral character” to the government. 
What exactly is this “political-moral character,” and how should principles 
from a declaration of independence be understood in relation to the state and its 
polity? In the American context, Abraham Lincoln offers a compelling 
interpretation: 
All this is not the result of accident. It has a philosophical cause. 
Without the Constitution and the Union, we could not have attained 
the result; but...there is something back of these, entwining itself 
more closely about the human heart. That something, is the 
principle of ‘Liberty to all’...The expression of that principle, in our 
Declaration of Independence, was most happy, and fortunate...[It] 
has proved an ‘apple of gold’ to us. The Union, and the Constitution, 
are the picture of silver, subsequently framed around it.6 
 
Although Lincoln never used this vivid imagery in a public address, his rich 
understanding of the Declaration of Independence as a source of guiding 
principles strongly informed his approach to American government. He is not 
alone in this approach—in discussing the institutional framework of the Israeli 
government, David Ben-Gurion wrote, “The legal and democratic system we wish 
to fortify is designed to give effect and permanence to [the Israeli Declaration of 
Independence].”7 While the two founding documents have crucial differences, 
each is an attempt to introduce and outline “the intellectual contours for 
                                               
5 Throughout this paper, I will refer to this as the “Israeli Declaration of Independence.” 
6 Abraham Lincoln, "Fragment on the Constitution and Union," Teaching American History, 
accessed May 11, 2017, http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/fragment-on-the-
constitution-and-union/. 
7 David Ben-Gurion, Rebirth and Destiny of Israel (New York City, NY: Philosophical Library, 
1954), [375]. 
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constitutional discourse about how these societies arrange their fundamental 
rules and governing practices.”8  
In both cases, the apple of gold is the polity’s conceptual core; it offers 
guiding principles for how the government should seek to build a political 
system—its picture of silver. And although there remains ample room for 
interpretation, the principles point toward a certain structure of government. 
However, the Israeli Declaration of Independence is not so straightforward. As I 
suggested above, it has two conceptual cores that lie in fundamental tension with 
one another. The two passages I point to below are not necessarily incoherent, 
but in practice, constructing a “Jewish State” has often conflicted with the 
thoroughly liberal principles to which Israel commits itself in this second 
passage. The Israeli Declaration begins:  
The Land of Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here 
their spiritual, religious and political identity was shaped. Here they 
first attained to statehood, created cultural values of national and 
universal significance and gave to the world the eternal Book of 
Books… [This is] the Jewish State.9 
 
A few paragraphs later, however, the Israeli founders strike a very different tone: 
 
The state of Israel...will foster the development of the country for 
the benefit of all its inhabitants; it will be based on freedom, justice 
and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel; it will ensure 
complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants 
irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of 
religion, conscience, language, education and culture; it will 
safeguard the Holy Places of all religions; and it will be faithful to 
the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.10 
 
                                               
8 Jacobsohn, Apple of Gold, [5]. 
9 "The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel," Provisional Government of Israel, 
last modified May 14, 1948, accessed May 11, 2017, 
https://www.knesset.gov.il/docs/eng/megilat_eng.htm. 
10 Ibid. 
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Each of the sections is internally consistent, and on its own either of them 
could lay a principled foundation for constructing a state’s picture of silver. 
However, in Israel, the regime-defining question is one of competing visions and 
constitutional priorities. As Jacobsohn puts it, “How one sees the Jewish 
state...will be decisive in determining the extent to which...liberal sentiments 
assume interpretive prominence.”11 Different parts of Israeli society see the 
Jewish state—as well as who and what is Jewish—in very different ways, and as 
Jacobsohn reminds us, there is no single “Zionist vision.”12 He goes on to assert: 
“The autonomous, neutral state of liberal constitutional theory does not present 
an altogether appropriate model for the Israeli polity.”13  
This type of assertion lies at the center of a great deal of the literature on 
Israeli Constitutionalism. In fact, this is precisely what sparked my interest in the 
topic; in many ways, I consider myself a classical liberal when it comes to 
constitutional structure, normative commitments, and aspirational principles, so 
as I learned more about the Israeli case, my initial approach was to demonstrate 
the ways in which the state’s “Jewish” identity undermined liberal-democracy.14 
At the time, my goal in diagnosing these “illiberal” or “undemocratic moments” 
was to issue an analytical, normative rebuke of “thick” state religion that 
                                               
11 Jacobsohn, Apple of Gold, [7]. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., 36 
14 More specifically, it was Gary Jacobsohn’s 1993 book Apple of Gold—and to some extent his 
later works, Wheel of Law (2005) and Constitutional Identity (2013)—that inspired me to to 
delve into the study of Israeli Constitutionalism. While Professor Jacobsohn continues to directly 
influence my framing of the topic, as is evident from how frequently I have cited his work, 
particularly in my first two sections, I believe his most significant contribution to my project is the 
doors he opened for my own exploration.  
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threatened my beloved liberal-democratic principles. After doing so, I 
endeavored to provide several different approaches for resolving this tension in 
favor of my preferred principles and constitutional structure. Not surprisingly, 
none of them appeared particularly promising, but fortunately, education 
intervened. In addition to my theoretical background in nationalism and state-
building,15 reading authors like Yael Tamir,16 Sammy Smooha,17 and Ahmet T. 
Kuru18 has vastly complicated my understanding of equality, constitutionalism, 
and government more generally. For this, these scholars (and many others) have 
my deepest gratitude. 
As far as categorization is concerned, I have concluded that none of the 
many shorthand labels for describing Israel’s socio-political system is particularly 
useful, because all of them inevitably overlook state-specific nuance. One might 
respond that these theoretical frameworks should merely serve as a starting 
point, not an all-inclusive definition. Yet by this logic, I am not sure why we 
should rely upon arbitrary categories such as liberal-democracy and ethnocracy. 
In this vein, a bucket of white paint serves as a useful heuristic. Let us assume 
that the bucket of white paint represents the ethnocratic or ethno-national “ideal 
type,” and that a nearby can of black paint represents the liberal-democratic one. 
                                               
15 For this I am indebted to Professor Kristin Fabbe, whose course entitled “Nations, Nationalism, 
and State-Building in the Middle East” provided me with a strong theoretical foundation in these 
topics, and I have since seen civic identity and state institutions through a new lense. More than 
this, Professor Fabbe has been a kind and caring mentor as well as an academic and intellectual 
inspiration ever since I took her 8:10 am class during the spring of my Freshman Year. 
16 Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). 
17 Sammy Smooha, "The model of ethnic democracy: Israel as a Jewish and democratic state," 
Nations and Nationalism 8, no. 4 (2002) 
18 Ahmet T. Kuru, Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The United States, France, and 
Turkey (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 
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As you start to drip black paint into the bucket, stirring all the while, at what 
point does it become “black”? If you have a gallon of white paint and you’ve only 
added a tablespoon of black paint, is the resulting color black? And what if you 
dump in the entire can? There would obviously be a noticeable difference 
between these two mixtures, but describing it would be difficult if you could only 
say either that they are black or that they are white. Applying this concept to my 
project, instead of attempting to argue that the proverbial “color” of the Israeli 
polity is either not quite black or not quite white, I will adopt a different 
paradigm which seeks to describe the actual shade of gray that one sees in this 
unique mixture.19 
In short, the purpose of my project has changed significantly. My aim is to 
describe the evolution of Israeli civic identity and Constitutionalism in an 
interesting and informative way, while placing these elements of the Israeli polity 
into contemporary context. Overall, while I have retained the 
illiberal/undemocratic “moment” terminology, I am decidedly uninterested in 
reprimanding the Israeli polity for departing from liberal-democratic principles 
in favor of the state’s Jewish identity—although in many cases, I would have 
personally preferred that they resisted those ethno-national tendencies. As 
opposed to offering policy proposals or prescribing moral remedies, in this thesis, 
I seek to approach the core tensions in Israeli Constitutionalism from a more 
                                               
19 I owe this formulation, and a great deal more, to Professor Gary Gilbert. Although I was unable 
to add him as a second reader, Professor Gilbert went above and beyond, reading countless drafts 
and coming in specifically to discuss complex topics regarding Judaism and Israeli society. 
Professor Gilbert’s expertise and advice have shaped this project more than it would be 
reasonable to expect, but I am most thankful for his time and care throughout the process. 
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positivist perspective. At the outset, I am happy to concede that I may not do so 
perfectly. Moreover, I should note that while I take pains to avoid normative 
finger-wagging, much of my analysis can quite easily be leveraged to criticize 
various actors or institutions for violating minority rights and human rights, as 
well as for undermining substantive equality. I do not view this as a shortcoming 
of my project, but rather as a potential extension of it. 
 
*  * * 
 
 In what follows, I will first outline the evolution of Israeli 
constitutionalism, particularly as it relates to the historical foundations of judicial 
review and what I call a protracted “tug-of-war” over foundational principles. As I 
hope to make clear, this push and pull was largely veiled in the realm of 
theoretical abstractions about constitutional priorities; up until Barak’s 
“constitutional revolution” in 1992, there was a degree of consensus that the 
state’s Jewish identity should, in practice, come before its liberal-democratic one. 
Somewhat similar to the American “second founding,”20 it took Israel several 
decades to confront the tensions and contradictions lying dormant in its 
foundational texts. I will conclude chapter 1 by formally introducing the concept 
of an illiberal or undemocratic “moment,” in addition to drawing out an 
important caveat regarding this framework in the context of Israeli history.  
Next, I will hone-in on an important piece of legislation currently making 
its way through the Knesset entitled, “Basic Law: The Nation-State of the Jewish 
                                               
20 For an excellent discussion of the Second Founding, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: 
Creation and Reconstruction(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000) 
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People.” As is clear from its name, in several ways, the bill elevates the state’s 
Jewish identity at the expense of its liberal-democratic principles. An assessment 
of this legislation’s likely impact on belonging, civic identity, and the 
perpetuation of second-class citizenship lie at the core of my second chapter. 
Drawing on concrete provisions of the bill as well as contemporary policies, this 
section illustrates the Israeli polity’s desire to prioritize its social and legal 
identity as a Jewish State at the expense of liberal-democratic principles to which 
it is also committed.  
Chapter 3 is situated within this context, and my goal in this section is to 
assess whether the Israeli Supreme Court can be an effective countervailing 
force—a true and reliable guardian of liberal-democracy. If it is in a position to 
defend these principles, to what extent can it play this “democratizing” role, and 
how should it go about doing so? While proponents of liberal-democracy might 
balk at these manifestations of judicial restraint, a deeper understanding of 
Israeli Constitutionalism suggests what initially seems counter-intuitive. I argue 
that both approaches were actually quite prudent, and in fact, varying degrees of 
deference are necessary for maintaining any space at all the Court’s defense of 
liberal-democratic principles in the future. Indeed, as reflected by his opinion in 
Ka’adan, perhaps Barak was implicitly aware of limitations on the Court acting as 
“republican schoolmaster,” an approach that is especially intractable within 
“rifted democracies” like Israel. For a number of reasons, I believe that in the 
Israeli context, the prospects for this pedagogical approach are quite grim. This is 
especially true in the present moment. Due in part to the changing politics of 
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Supreme Court appointments, as well as the contemporary socio-political 
landscape, recent rulings have undermined liberal-democratic principles, 
resulting in a lack of judicial protection for Israeli minorities in several important 
contexts.  
As I will explain in chapter 4, even in “landmark” cases where justices like 
Aharon Barak sought to uphold liberal-democratic principles, the Court’s 
language was actually quite tepid. Beginning with the famous Ka’adan decision in 
2000, the High Court of Justice’s approach to segregation and discrimination in 
land allocation also fell short of liberal-democratic principles.21 This was partially 
due to ineffective enforcement, but more importantly, the Court’s assertion of 
liberal principles was deeply lacking in force. Moreover, when the Court upheld 
the “Admissions Committees Law” in 2014, the majority invoked the “ripeness” 
doctrine, a jurisprudential approach that has not been seen in Israeli 
Constitutionalism—and certainly not majority opinions—until very recently. In a 
brief subsection at the end of this chapter, I quickly examine three important 
Court cases from the past decade. First, I will demonstrate that the Court has 
maintained a somewhat more activist approach in cases relating to African 
refugees beginning in 2013, but I predict that judicial protection of liberal-
democratic principle—namely, in this instance, human rights—may be 
temporary, even in this limited realm. The next case I discuss is the Court’s 2011 
                                               
21 Throughout this thesis, I will almost exclusively be discussing cases that come to the Israeli 
Supreme Court under its jurisdiction as the High Court of Justice, because it is in this capacity 
that the national judiciary acts as a constitutional court. For simplicity’s sake, I chose to use the 
more general, more universal term, although it is admittedly less precise. 
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decision to uphold the “Nakba Law,” which significantly limits political 
expression and contributes to the erasure of the Palestinian historical narrative 
surrounding Israel’s founding. Finally, I turn to the Court’s 2015 decision in the 
“Boycott Case,” which articulated a thoroughly impoverished understanding of 
equality as part of the basis for a ruling which powerfully undermined the 
freedom of political expression. Aside from the Court’s (potentially temporary) 
protection of African refugees, all of the decisions that I discuss have both 
demonstrated and contributed to the development of a more deferential 
jurisprudence. 
In my conclusion, I endeavor to widen the scope of my project. I attempt 
to discern whether the state’s legal system, its political structure, and the Israeli 
polity itself is experiencing a more fundamental shift that transcends the tension 
between the state’s two foundational sets of principles. In other words, to what 
extent does the recent emphasis on Israel’s “Jewishness”—in the context of 
illiberal or undemocratic moments, the nation-state bill, and the Court’s 
declining influence—represent a departure from what came before it? Are we 
witnessing the beginnings of a transformational moment in the Israeli 
constitutional scheme that consistently and pervasively prioritizes the state’s 
Jewish identity? These are some of the most interesting questions in the study of 
modern Israeli Constitutionalism. Resisting the urge to prognosticate on when 
illiberalism in Israel will reach a “critical mass”—which is not the norm in the 
literature on this topic—I once again shift the paradigm. Under my more state-
11 
 
specific approach, if there is such a transformational shift, we will probably never 
know for sure. 
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Chapter 1: Barak’s “Constitutional Revolution” and the Tug-of-War 
over Foundational Principles 
  
“A constitution is not the act of a government, but of a people constituting 
a government.”22 
- Thomas Paine 
 
 In this chapter, I aim to trace major points in Israel’s constitutional 
evolution through 1995, taking particular care to draw out the legal basis for the 
Court’s broad powers of judicial review. As I hope to make clear, while Chief 
Justice Barak based his “constitutional revolution” upon Basic Law: Human 
Dignity and Liberty, his transformative interpretation hardly reflected the 
Knesset’s intentions and expectations. Indeed, the context surrounding this 
legislation and Barak’s legal reasoning in United Mizrachi Bank v. Migdal 
Cooperative Village (1995) both indicate that an enormous degree of activism 
was necessary to establish the Court’s broad powers of judicial review. 
Nevertheless, Barak’s jurisprudence reflects a critical juncture in the Israeli 
polity's tug-of-war over constitutional principles: in practical terms, the state’s 
foundational constitutional tension had been largely dormant to this point, but 
Chief Justice Barak’s rulings brought it to the fore. As the rest of my thesis will 
demonstrate, the Barak Court’s jurisprudence has had far-reaching impacts on 
the Israeli polity, and its consequences will continue to be felt for years to come. I 
will conclude this chapter with a brief note on what I call illiberal or 
                                               
22 Thomas Paine, Rights of Man (New York City, NY: Penguin Books, 1985), [185]. 
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undemocratic “moments,” explaining how they fit in with the history of the 
Jewish State. 
 
A. Tracing Israel’s Constitutional Evolution 
Israel has one of the most complex and interesting processes of 
constitutional evolution of any liberal democracy. The story begins with the 
Israeli Declaration, which called for the drafting of a constitution “not later than 
the 1st October 1948.” Two years later, however, there was still no consensus on 
which principles should guide the constitutional framework—should Israel adopt 
the Torah as its constitution, or should it codify a traditional liberal democratic 
document which endorsed civil liberties in tension with Jewish law? In a third 
camp were those who opposed any constitution at all, including David Ben-
Gurion, Israel’s preeminent Founding Father. As he put it, “Do we need a 
Constitution like the American? By all means let us profit from the experience of 
others and borrow laws and procedures from them, provided they match our 
needs.”23  
In keeping with Lincoln’s metaphor from my introduction, the Israeli 
Founders could have picked an apple of gold or simply ignored the tree 
altogether. However, another option presented itself: in 1950, the First Knesset 
adopted a compromise known as the Harari Resolution.24 Instead of writing a 
single document, this piecemeal approach stipulated that the “constitution” of 
                                               
23 David Ben-Gurion, Rebirth and Destiny of Israel (New York City, NY: Philosophical Library, 
1954), [370]. 
24 Named for Knesset Member Yizhar Harari, the Resolution’s sponsor. 
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Israel would be composed of a series of Basic Laws to be created over time by the 
Constitution, Law and Justice Committee. Ultimately, the goal was to consolidate 
these Basic Laws—which were seen as superior to ordinary legislation and 
required a special majority to repeal—into a single document to be presented to 
and ratified by the Knesset.25 The process has taken much longer than 
anticipated.  
However, in Jacobsohn’s words, the claim that Israel has no written 
constitution “turns out to be at best a half-truth. [In 1993] what the country 
lack[ed was] a formal bill of rights and judicial review over legislation.”26 After 
the Harari Resolution, the next major step in Israel’s constitutional evolution 
came in Bergman v. Minister of Interior (1969), and it deals with the latter of 
these two omissions: judicial review. This decision revolutionized the Israeli legal 
system by introducing de facto judicial review for primary legislation. Yet as 
Amos Shapira puts it, “Although the Bergman decision speaks the language of 
restraint, it actually engages in judicial activism par excellence.”27 In this respect, 
comparing Bergman to Marbury rings true in two different ways: first, both 
cases laid the foundation for judicial review in their respective polities, and 
second, both Justices writing the decisions would likely have been horrified to 
learn how their opinions have been construed by judicial supremacists. Chief 
Justice John Marshall “might have seen fit to enter a vigorous disclaimer”28 if he 
                                               
25 "Harari Proposal Passes, Ending Prospects for an Israeli Constitution," Center for Israel 
Education, accessed May 11, 2017, https://israeled.org/harari-proposal-constitution/. 
26 Jacobsohn, Apple of Gold, [14]. 
27  Amos Shapira, "Judicial Review without a Constitution: The Israeli Paradox," Temple Law 
Quarterly 56 (1983): [414]. 
28 Jacobsohn, Apple of Gold, [124]. 
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foresaw the implications of Marbury, but Melville Nimmer explains why Justice 
Mosche Landau’s opinion was more far-reaching than that of his American 
counterpart: “Where Chief Justice Marshall declared an Act of Congress void 
because it was in conflict with the Constitution, Mr. Justice Landau...declared an 
Act of the Knesset void despite the fact that Israel has not yet adopted a written 
constitution.”29 Though Justice Landau was skeptical of judicial activism, one 
might not come to that conclusion based on his jurisprudential legacy. 
 Additionally, Bergman laid the foundation for Kach Party Faction v. 
Hillel (1985), another major Israeli Supreme Court case. This decision explicitly 
relied on Chief Justice Marshall’s argument for judicial supremacy as 
fundamentally linked to the separation of powers. Chief Justice Barak is often 
credited with (or criticized for) driving a major shift in the role of the Israeli 
Supreme Court, and one might argue that it began with Hillel. In his opinion for 
the Court, Barak wrote: 
It is the responsibility of this Court to act as the ultimate interpreter 
of the Constitution...These words are not special to a legal system in 
which there is a formal constitution, and which recognizes judicial 
review of the lawfulness of legislation. These words are fundamental 
truths in every legal system in which there is an independent judicial 
branch.30 
 
However, there was no guarantee that Israeli society—let alone the Knesset or the 
executive authority of the state—would agree with Barak’s characterization. 
Indeed, despite this opinion, Jacobsohn advocates judicial restraint. In his words, 
                                               
29 Melville B. Nimmer, “The Uses of Judicial Review in Israel’s Quest for a Constitution,” 
Columbia Law Review 70 (1970): [1218]. 
30 Kach Party Faction v. Hillel (1985) 
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“Developing a de facto bill of rights through statutory interpretation and 
administrative review does not entail the degree of certainty or finality that is 
involved in judicial review of primary legislation.”31 In his view, “all constitutions 
are an attempt to ‘freeze’ certain principles,”32 and since there remains no final 
settlement of regime principles, the Court should avoid making normative 
“judgements of finality.”33 In settling these principles, Jacobsohn suggests that it 
may have made sense to postpone the constitutional decision until a much larger 
percentage of Jews resided within Israel, given the burgeoning immigrant 
population at the time and the fact that the state understood itself to be 
representing the Jewish people at large (whether or not Jews themselves, 
particularly in the diaspora, recognize this as valid).34  
Yet Chief Justice Barak did precisely the opposite, and in 1992, he 
attempted to “close the door” on the Israeli constitutional revolution.35 In my 
view, doing so was not wholly unreasonable. For example, consider the fact that 
Americans’ “more successful venture in 1787 was not attributable to any massive 
                                               
31 Jacobsohn, Apple of Gold, [132]. 
32 Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, "After the Revolution," Israel Law Review 34, no. 2 (July 2000): 
[140]. 
33 Jacobsohn, Apple of Gold, [132]. 
34 Indeed,  between 1990 and 1995 the average annual growth rate was a staggering 3.5%, and 
immigrants—many of them from the Former Soviet Union—accounted for 56% of the increase 
over that six year time-span; both of these figures are among the highest of any period since the 
state’s founding. See this report from the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) for a more 
detailed breakdown of population growth in Israel up until the last decade, “Israel in statistics 
1948-2007,” and the CBS website (http://cbs.gov.il/reader) for more recent population data. 
Israel’s population has continued to grow at a rapid pace, although a much smaller percentage of 
growth is due to immigration; according to the Jewish Policy Center, Israel’s fertility rate is higher 
than any other country in the developed world, and a report released by the CBS in late 2016 
indicates that it has reached parity with the birth-rate of Arabs in Israel—dispelling (or at least 
curtailing) worries about a necessarily bi-national state in the future. According to the Jewish 
Virtual Library, as of 2016 an estimated 44% of Jews in the world reside in Israel.  
35 Jacobsohn, "After the Revolution," [140]. 
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infusion of new members into their ranks; rather, it resulted from specific lessons 
learned from actual experience under the earlier constitutional structure.”36 
Moreover, while the American Founders may not have been dealing with as 
divisive a political climate as that of 1992 Israel, the act of constitutional creation 
did involve employing certain principles to bring about unity of purpose despite 
deep ideological divisions. As is clearly evidenced by the sections that sanction 
slavery, the American Constitution “manifests a clear set of moral 
compromises.”37 In short, waiting for the right time to “freeze” Israel’s 
constitutional principles may have ensured practically perpetual ambivalence.  
 In 1992, the Israeli Knesset enacted two Basic Laws in an effort to create a 
written Bill of Rights in Israel. The first was entitled “Basic Law: Human Dignity 
and Liberty,” and it included rights to property, movement to and from Israel, 
liberty, dignity, and privacy. The second was called “Basic Law: Freedom of 
Occupation,” and this was the only freedom it protected. As Gideon Sapir points 
out, the omission of “several important human rights, such as equality, freedom 
of expression, and freedom of religion...was not an unintentional mistake but a 
deliberate act.”38  
While the passage of these Basic Laws was indeed an important event, they 
were only subsequently elevated to revolutionary significance by the Israeli 
Supreme Court. In Jacobsohn’s words, “The revolutionary content of the acts 
                                               
36 Jacobsohn, Apple of Gold, [103]. 
37 Jacobsohn, Apple of Gold, [104]. 
38 Gideon Sapir, "Constitutional Revolutions: Israel as a Case-Study," International Journal of 
Law in Context 5, no. 4 (December 2009): [36]. 
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inheres less in the actual substantive changes introduced by the enactments than 
it does in the possibilities latent within them for creative judicial intervention in 
the unresolved dilemma of regime definition.”39 Also known as the Gal decision, 
United Mizrachi Bank v. Migdal Cooperative Village (1995) definitively secured 
substantive judicial review of legislation as a political reality in Israel, in addition 
to reconceptualizing the status of certain fundamental rights to a level of 
normative superiority. As Jacobsohn notes, “Most [Israeli Supreme Court] cases 
are decided by three- or five-judge panels, depending on the importance of the 
case.”40 However, in hearing this appellate case, the Court convened an expanded 
panel of nine judges. While each of them wrote a separate opinion, Chief Justice 
Barak most fully elucidated the Court’s position; indeed, Barak’s ruling in Gal is 
widely regarded as his single most important piece of constitutional 
jurisprudence.  
The basic facts of the case are as follows: in 1992, the Knesset adopted the 
Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) Law in order to address a serious 
economic crisis by helping rehabilitate the agricultural sector. Among other 
things, the Law established a body called the “rehabilitator,” designed to settle, 
restructure, and even cancel debts incurred up until the end of 1987.41 Later that 
year, the Knesset passed Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which many 
MKs believed was a fairly innocuous piece of legislation. In fact, this Basic Law 
                                               
39 Jacobsohn, "After the Revolution," [140]. 
40 Jacobsohn, Apple of Gold, [70]. 
41 United Mizrachi Bank v. Migdal Cooperative Village (1995). For full decision in English, see 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/93/210/068/z01/93068210.z01.pdf  
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was not even adopted by a majority of the Knesset; of the parliamentary body’s 
120 members, only 32 voted in favor of the bill. Because this constituted a 
majority of those present, the Basic Law was passed.42 In 1993, the Knesset saw 
fit to amend the agricultural rehabilitation Law, redefining which debts this Law 
could address and stipulating that debts incurred up until 1991 were now within 
the scope of the Law. The appellants argued that the Amendment violated their 
property rights under section 3 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty without 
meeting section 8’s requirement that rights set out in the Basic Law could not be 
violated except “by means of a law that corresponds to the values of the State of 
Israel, which serves an appropriate purpose, and to an extent that does not 
exceed what is required.”43  
Barak’s opinion first established that the Knesset serves two purposes: it 
enacts ordinary laws as a legislature, but when it approves Basic Laws, it acts as a 
constituent assembly. In turn, this latter category of legislation enjoys supra-
legislative and quasi-constitutional status.44 The next question was whether the 
agricultural rehabilitation Law was unconstitutional. The Court unanimously 
held that while the Law did in fact violate the appellants’ section 3 property 
rights, this violation was justified under section 8 of the Basic Law.45 In other 
words, Barak’s opinion in Gal established the legal basis for broad judicial review 
without directly challenging the specific law at issue in the case. Given the fact 
                                               
42 Professor Shlomo Slonim in Richard A. Posner, “Judicial Review, a Comparative Perspective: 
Israel, Canada, and the United States” (2010) p. 2422 
43 For the unofficial English translation of the Basic Law, see 
http://knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/BasicLawLiberty.pdf  
44 United Mizrachi Bank v. Migdal Cooperative Village (1995).  
45 Ibid. 
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that this case and the jurisprudence based upon it are what provided Israel with 
its “constitutional revolution,” it appears that this maneuver was quite prudent. 
However, Barak’s ruling was also an instance of extraordinary judicial 
activism. Michael Eitan, who was in the Knesset at the time, offers a striking first-
hand account of the parliamentary process leading up to the Basic Law’s 
enactment: 
I clashed with the Chairman of the Constitution, Law and Justice 
Committee [Uriel Linn] when he brought the law to the final 
reading and I can testify personally that the word "constitution" was 
not mentioned by anyone of the members of the Knesset...It's the 
first time I hear that a country can get a constitution retroactively. 
At the time of the legislation, the members of the Knesset did not 
know that they were adopting a constitution for the State of Israel, 
nor did anyone else. How do I know? In the newspapers the day 
after the enactment of the law, no one mentioned it.46 
 
It seems awfully strange that a constituent assembly could pass a constitution—
or, at the very least, a Bill of Rights—without knowing that they were doing so. It 
seems stranger still that nobody else in Israel knew this was happening. Although 
it powerfully impacts the entire Israeli polity, it appears that only the Barak Court 
was aware of this “revolutionary” moment. This is because the Justices, in fact, 
created it.  
In order to establish broad judicial review as an element of Israeli 
jurisprudence, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty required a great deal of 
judicial activism. Despite the fact that the Basic Law received only 32 of 120 votes 
                                               
46 Richard A. Posner, “Judicial Review, a Comparative Perspective: Israel, Canada, and the United 
States” (2010) p. 2422 
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in the Knesset, a few months after its passage, Barak made a bold (and at the 
time, puzzling) assertion:  
The new legislation passed by the Knesset limits the Knesset and 
subordinates it to the fundamental principles. From this point on 
the Court cannot only interpret a statute that is contrary to the 
fundamental principles, it can also nullify it...the people have given 
its judges a powerful tool. Now that the people have given us tools, 
we shall do the work.47 
 
Barak’s claim that “the people” granted the Israeli Supreme Court its broad 
powers of judicial review is shaky at best. However, one should recognize that the 
text of the Basic Law is in fact quite broad, so if the Knesset possessed 
constitutional authority when approving it, Justice Barak’s jurisprudence may be 
justified. 
 In any case, what is most important about the “constitutional revolution” 
is the fact that it represents a critical juncture for the Israeli polity. To this point, 
the state’s core constitutional tension had been largely dormant, because in 
reality, the Israeli polity consistently prioritized the state’s Jewish identity. 
However, Barak’s body of jurisprudence gave Israel’s largely theoretical set of 
liberal-democratic principles significant practical purchase. This meant that in 
several important contexts, the Jewish State was now forced to come to terms 
with all of its constitutional commitments. In issuing his opinion, Chief Justice 
Barak hoped to affirm a particular political reality, which, if it were broadly 
accepted, would lead to the achievement of constitutional politics.48 However, the 
process of political redefinition requires much more than a landmark Supreme 
                                               
47 Ibid. 
48 Jacobsohn, "After the Revolution," [144]. 
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Court decision, or even a slew of them; it must be a collective venture.49 In fact, 
Barak himself seemed to recognize this: 
The judge is not the only musician within the grand legal orchestra, 
and his playing must be in harmony with the rest of the music...The 
existence of a constitution conferring rights on the individual has not 
yet been sufficiently clarified in Israeli society.50 
 
 Thus, the process of “composing” the Israeli polity remains incomplete, even 
after the 1992 constitutional revolution. While Chief Justice Barak did much to 
advance liberal democratic principles in Israel’s constitutional jurisprudence, in 
practice, the competing apple of gold still regularly undermines them. As I will 
explain below, this is no accident. However, it is also crucial to note that by 
introducing Israel’s constitutional tension into the public sphere, the Barak 
Court’s jurisprudence forced all of the Israeli polity to confront it. As I will 
ultimately suggest, I believe that this civic engagement is likley to lead Israel to 
continue to highlight its Jewish identity in practice, but more profoundly, it also 
might force the polity to genuinely weigh how much it values its status as the 
“Jewish State” against the substance underlying liberal-democratic principles. 
 
B. Brief Note on Illiberal and Undemocratic Moments: 
 
 At its foundation, the Zionist movement that led to Israel’s establishment 
was dedicated to creating a state for the Jewish people that would be guided by 
Jewish history and principles. In other words, when the state was founded in 
                                               
49 Bruce Ackerman, We the People, Volume 1: Foundations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 
1993), [203]. 
50 Aharon Barak, "The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy," Yale Law School Legal 
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1948, this ethno-religious national identity was inexorably linked to Israel’s 
raison d’etre, and even today, it seems impossible that the two can be fully 
separated.51 The state’s ethno-religious national identity includes a medley of 
latent forces which, when activated, will prioritize the state’s Jewish character. 
Despite what different actors in Israeli society may say about the state’s 
commitment to liberal-democratic principles, Israel’s ethno-national identity 
remains robust, and its manifestations often compromise what it means to be a 
liberal-democratic state.  
For example, Israeli settlement construction in the occupied West Bank 
represents an extended and fundamentally illiberal moment, and there is a clear 
link between this ongoing violation of international law and the fundamental 
tenets of Zionism.52 The settlers believe that the entire territory is the land of the 
Jewish people, and as such, it should all be part of the Jewish State. To them, 
Hebron is no different from Tel Aviv, and Nablus is no different from Haifa. It 
should be emphasized that this understanding is not an aberration, or even an 
innovation, for that matter; settlements in the occupied West Bank are part and 
parcel with Israel’s ethno-religious national identity. The 1967 War did not create 
                                               
51 Indeed, while UN Resolution 181 includes a commitment to several important liberal-
democratic principles, one could argue that by explicitly creating both a Jewish State and an Arab 
State, the international community inherently accepted that membership in each of them would 
be at least in part ethnically-based. 
52 It is important to note that this formulation discusses the practice of settlement construction 
merely in order to describe the underlying reasons for illiberal or undemocratic moments; 
however, the Israeli policies that sanction and encourage this ongoing violation of international 
law are crucial to understand in their own right. Moreover, the protracted nature of occupation 
may itself constitute an undemocratic moment; for a detailed and compelling account of this 
topic, see Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, Trouble in Utopia: The Overburdened Polity of Israel 
(New York City, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989). Nevertheless, both settlement 
construction and occupation are largely outside the purview of this paper. 
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a new ideology—it merely enabled the Zionist vision to better manifest as political 
reality.53 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
53 Some Israeli politicians, and many religious nationalists want to formally advance this vision, 
and it does not appear wholly implausible. As Education Minister and Diaspora Affairs Minister 
Naftali Bennett recently put it, “I am determined to advance the issue of sovereignty [over 
settlements]. It is a plan six years in the making and I really think that the rare constellation of a 
right-wing government in Israel, a favorable administration in DC and an international situation 
that enables it, should allow us to proceed after 50 years.” See The Jerusalem Post, "Despite US 
Pushback, Bennett Determined to Advance Sovereignty Over Settlements," February 23, 2018, 
Accessed April 23, 2018, http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Despite-US-push-back-
Bennett-determined-to-advance-sovereignty -over-settlements-542470. 
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Chapter 2: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People 
 
“Israel is a Jewish state. It isn’t a state of all its nations. That is, equal rights to all 
citizens but not equal national rights...There are places where the character of the 
State of Israel as a Jewish state must be maintained and this sometimes comes at 
the expense of equality...without violating the full rights of the Arab residents of 
Israel...there is a place to maintain a Jewish majority even at the price of violation 
of rights.”54 
- Israeli Minister of Justice Ayelet Shaked, 2018 Speech to Knesset 
 
“The proposed Basic Law is built on a fundamental misunderstanding: The fact 
that Israel is the national homeland of the Jewish people does not justify 
violating the fundamental rights of non-Jews. On the contrary: in terms of justice 
and fairness, the fact that Israel is a national homeland for the Jewish people 
requires the state to be extra scrupulous in protecting equality...in order to 
compensate for the inevitable exclusion that stems from the definition of the state 
as a Jewish state.”55 
- Professor Mordechai Kremnitzer 
 
 
 
A. History of the Proposed Basic Law 
 
On August 3rd of 2011, Avi Dichter, a member of the right-wing Kadima 
Party, introduced a bill to the Israeli Knesset entitled “Basic Law: Israel as the 
Nation-State of the Jewish People.” According to Dichter and his colleagues, the 
passage and subsequent interpretation of Israel’s two normative Basic Laws—one 
of which focused on securing “Human Dignity and Liberty” and the second on 
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“Freedom of Occupation”—helped secure the place of democracy in the state’s 
legal code, but Israel’s Jewish character was not sufficiently anchored in the 
law.56 In this vein, it is important that the signatories insisted that this bill also be 
passed as a Basic Law; as I will explain shortly, this would afford it quasi-
constitutional status and require a special majority to repeal. The proposed 
legislation has gone through several iterations, but the most recent version has 
already passed a first reading and is likely to be fast-tracked in the coming weeks. 
One of the bill’s central tenets is the assertion that the “Right of national 
self-determination in the State of Israel is unique to the Jewish People.” 
Immediately after this provision, the text mandates, “This Basic Law and all other 
laws shall be interpreted in conformity with this provision.” Often referred to as 
the “supremacy clause,” this sentence reflects the author’s intent not only to 
change the law, but to change the way the law is interpreted.57 As I will explain 
below, especially since Chief Justice Barak’s “constitutional revolution” in the 
1990s, the Court has repeatedly struck down laws and policies it viewed as 
illiberal or undemocratic. In large part, the nation-state legislation was designed 
to counteract what many Israeli politicians see as an overly activist Supreme 
Court. In fact, much of the Israeli polity agrees. According to the Israeli 
Democracy Index, an annual survey of Israeli public opinion, in 2017 only 57% of 
Jewish Israelis and 54% of Arab Israelis expressed trust in the Supreme Court, 
                                               
56 Naomi Sussmann,  Basic Law: Israel— Nation-state of the Jewish People, Translated by 
Elisheva 
    Goldberg, Molad, The Center for the Renewal of Israeli Democracy, 2011, Accessed April 23, 
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down from 70% among all Israelis in 2003.58 Below, I will assess whether—and to 
what extent—distrust, accusations of judicial activism, and the Court’s ideological 
bias are warranted, but at this juncture, what is important to note is the fact that 
this ethos has developed. 
This effort to alter the basic structure of the Israeli legal system is 
significant in other ways as well, and in particular, several additional provisions 
are worth highlighting. If passed, the bill would have downgraded Arabic from its 
status as an official language alongside Hebrew to a language with “special 
standing,” allowed communities to segregate on the basis of religion, and 
mandated that judges in Israeli courts consult Jewish religious law (Halakha) in 
cases where existing law offers no solutions. Moreover, it would grant 
constitutional permanence to the Israeli national anthem (Hatikvah), Israeli flag, 
and the state symbol—each of which is rife with exclusionary symbolism, as I will 
discuss below—as well as the Law of Return and a mandate to teach “the history 
of the Jewish people, its heritage and its traditions...in all educational institutions 
serving the Jewish public.”59 
The legislation was largely formulated by the Institute for Zionist 
Strategies, and it immediately ignited fierce debate within the parliamentary 
                                               
58 I also suspect that Jewish- and Arab-Israelis have declining trust in the Court for different 
reasons: Jews because of a perceived sense of activism, and Arabs because of a lack thereof. 
However, both groups clearly do not hold the Court in as high regard as they used to. As I will 
demonstrate in Chapter 3, this downward trend extends all the way back to the beginning of 
Barak’s “constitutional revolution” in 1992. For the statistics provided above, see the 2003 Israeli 
Democracy Index https://en.idi.org.il/media/6323/index2003-eng.pdf and the 2017 edition 
https://en.idi.org.il/media/9837/israeli-democracy-index-2017-en-summary.pdf 
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body and the public sphere. To put matters in familiar terms, the passage of this 
initial version would have emphatically demonstrated the preeminence of Israel’s 
identity as a “Jewish State” over its commitment to liberal democracy. However, 
in 2011 the more conservative Members of Knesset (MKs) pushing for its 
approval soon realized that it was too radical to be passed as written, and in the 
wake of intense public backlash, several MKs formally withdrew their support for 
the bill before the Kadima Party chairwoman ultimately instructed Dichter to 
“shelve” it.60 The chairwoman was obviously making a political calculation, 
choosing “damage-control” in the face of backlash against a proposal that was too 
radical for the political moment. Since then, this Basic Law legislation has 
reemerged on several occasions, taking different forms each time.  
For example, in 2013 two different versions were submitted to the Knesset, 
one of which was proposed by Likud MK Ze’ev Elkin and the other by members of 
each of the three right-wing coalition parties—Likud MK Yariv Levin, far-right 
Jewish Home MK (and future Justice Minister) Ayelet Shaked, and Yisrael 
Beytenu MK Robert Ilatov. In late 2014, Prime Minister Netanyahu’s cabinet 
promised to support these bills in a preliminary reading “on the condition” that 
proponents of both bills allow the administration to draft a government-
sponsored version based on fourteen guiding principles.61 Israel’s democratic 
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character, and the way that term is understood in the nation’s socio-political and 
legal framework, are central elements of my discussion below.62 Thus, for the 
purposes of this thesis it is particularly important to note that Netanyahu’s list of 
principles implicitly affirmed democracy was an inherent part of the state’s 
identity—describing Israel as a “Jewish and democratic state”—whereas in both 
of the proposed bills, the state’s rhetorical commitment to democracy is 
comparatively watered-down: “The State of Israel has a democratic form of 
government.”63 Defining the state as democratic implies that the polity values 
democracy in its own right, while the more muted version suggests 
proceduralism and an instrumental approach to democracy. 
In early 2017, another iteration of the bill was approved by Netanyahu’s 
cabinet for a preliminary reading, and the sponsors have been trying to garner 
coalition support since then. On March 13th of this year, coalition MKs struck a 
deal that would practically guarantee the bill’s passage by removing some of its 
more contentious provisions.64 It is worth delving into the specifics of this near-
final version, because a discussion of the future Basic Law’s implications—as well 
as the commentary and debate surrounding it—will help frame the rest of my 
discussion. 
                                               
62 Interestingly, both Netanyahu’s list of principles and the two 2013 bills purport to relied upon 
principles contained in the Israeli Declaration of Independence, demonstrating the salience of the 
fundamental tension I discussed above. 
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speed up negotiations on the nation-state bill. 
30 
 
In an effort to gain support for this latest version, Likud MK Amir Ohana, 
chairman of the special committee on the nation-state bill, requested one major 
departure from previous formulations: the removal of the Halakha provision.65 
As I noted above, this clause would have required courts to consult Jewish 
religious law in cases where legal precedent and the legislation in question 
offered insufficient guidance, and as such, it was deeply unpopular among many 
moderates—let alone the very vocal ideological left. Hoping to garner votes, the 
bill’s advocates also dropped the provision that would explicitly 
“constitutionalize” the Law of Return, replacing it with more general rhetoric 
emphasizing that Israel is open to “Jewish aliya and the ingathering of exiles.”66 
This almost certainly assuaged some important concerns on the left. However, 
the coalition’s most significant concession was the removal of the so-called 
“supremacy clause” mentioned above. The clause might have given the nation-
state law—and the State’s Jewish identity—precedence over even other basic 
laws, which was obviously quite appealing to conservative MKs seeking to alter 
the very basis of the Israeli legal system. Thus, the committee must have 
concluded that holding on to the “supremacy clause” would prevent passage of 
the legislation in the given timeframe, so they decided to bite the bullet.  
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Despite these concessions, the legislation marks a major turning-point in 
Israel’s history. In a powerful sense, it seeks to re-define the Israeli polity while 
simultaneously laying the groundwork to re-structure some of the state’s basic 
political structures and priorities. Specifically, the nation-state bill was designed 
to 1) impact the limits of judicial interpretation and 2) re-interpret the phrase 
“Jewish and Democratic” as it relates to the Israeli constitutional scheme. With 
regards to the first of these two goals, MK Ohana called the near-final version 
“the law of all laws,” in part because of the impact it would have on the Israeli 
Supreme Court. In drawing this out, he spoke in the language of individual and 
collective rights, which are often at the crux of the Court’s most high-profile 
cases: “It is the most important law in the history of the State of Israel…[it] says 
that everyone has human rights, but national rights...belong only to the Jewish 
People.”67 Moreover, after the compromise was made, MK Dichter (author of the 
original nation-state bill) was quick to point out that removing the “supremacy 
clause” would not make the future basic law weaker than any of its quasi-
constitutional counterparts.68 Far-right Justice Minister69 Ayelet Shaked, an 
ardent supporter of the legislation, explicitly stated that the nation-state bill “is a 
tool that we want to give the [Supreme C]ourt for the future.”70 In short, as the 
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judiciary weighs competing principles and priorities in the future, there remains 
room for interpretation, but when this bill becomes (basic) law, those on the right 
will have a very powerful constitutional weapon at their disposal. 
The second major driving force behind the nation-state legislation is 
closely bound up with the first. In an attempt to re-interpret the phrase “Jewish 
and Democratic,” proponents of this bill are seeking to elevate Israel’s Jewish 
identity above its competing liberal-democratic one. Whether their efforts will 
lead to a lasting resolution of the foundational tension in Israeli 
constitutionalism by establishing the preeminence of Israel’s “Jewishness” 
remains to be seen, but there are clear indications that this bill attempts to shift 
the balance in that direction.71 In making this point, allow me to highlight several 
provisions of the nation-state bill that were not abandoned in the negotiating 
process.  
The effort to elevate Israel’s Jewish identity is most obviously discerned 
from the provisions anchoring the current state symbol, flag, and national 
anthem as part of the constitutional structure.72 In a manner similar to the 
demotion of Arabic from an official language to one with “special standing,” these 
provisions send a message that some people “belong” more than others. True, the 
flag and anthem have been in place since 1948, and Hebrew has long been held in 
high regard in the Israeli state, but affording them quasi-constitutional status 
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implies an important sense of permanence. Moreover, those that the state has 
chosen to exclude in these different ways are the same group of people: non-
Jews. However, let us pause for a moment to elucidate the nature of this 
exclusion and its normative implications. In the following subsections, I hope to 
demonstrate how theory and comparative constitutionalism can inform a 
pragmatic discussion around this specific piece of legislation. 
 
B. American Group Rights, Israel’s Brand of Pluralism, and Civic Identities 
 
In drawing out the Israeli model of pluralism, let us begin by comparing 
group rights in Israel with those codified in the United States. In most cases, the 
modern American model of pluralism takes the individual as the relevant unit of 
analysis. The 1960s involved a transformative shift that all but cemented the 
individual rights approach; indeed, as Jacobsohn puts it the Civil Rights 
Movement demanded “the delegitimation of group membership as a criterion in 
the making of public decisions about individuals. Indeed, the underlying 
aspiration…[is] the replacement of ascriptive recognition with a universal 
standard of transcendent equality.”73  
Of course, there are a few major exceptions to this individual rights-
focused pluralism, including the U.S. government’s approach to Native 
Americans. In 1968, Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act, which granted 
Americans of Indian descent the same rights and duties as the rest of the 
American polity. However, many Native Americans (somewhat justifiably) 
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viewed this as a “cultural assault,” because grafting the individual rights schema 
onto the Native Americans’ legal tradition effectively undermined their way of 
life. For example, equal protection standards surrounding sexual discrimination 
might subvert “tribal determinations of membership based on patrilineal 
criteria.”74 Congress was sensitive to the concern that extending civil rights to 
Native Americans had a distinctly assimilationist character. In a 1978 opinion, 
Justice Marshall pointed to Congress’s deliberate, “selective incorporation,” 
which was part of an effort to accommodate the “unique political, cultural, and 
economic needs of tribal governments.”75 As Jacobsohn aptly points out, this 
application of group-rights jurisprudence enabled “the tribe to defend its cultural 
autonomy in the face of widespread pressures to conform to societal norms and 
behavior.” To this end, certain tribes have also been granted formal legal 
protection in matters like marriage and divorce, hunting privileges, and 
education.76 
However, it is important to note that in the United States this is a 
constitutional anomaly, not a widely applied legal norm.77 By and large, the 
American system preserves pluralism by protecting individual rights. With 
regards to religion in particular, the Constitution’s Establishment Clause helps 
maintain a horizontal boundary between church and state, ensuring that religion 
is almost entirely irrelevant to a person’s standing in the political community.78 
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As such, in the United States, the power of religious groups is largely confined to 
the space of civil society—they do not enjoy categorically different legal 
protection. 
On the other hand, Israeli pluralism affirms a central place for group 
rights in the legal system, especially among different religious groups. This is not 
at all unusual for Middle Eastern countries, past or present; as I suggested 
earlier, it is endemic to the region. One historical precursor to Israel’s pluralistic 
configuration is the Ottoman millet system. Because the Empire included so 
many different ethno-religious groups, the Ottomans avoided assimilation (and 
thus conflict) by constructing a legal system that “perpetuat[ed] the separate 
existence of particular communities.”79 When they succeeded the Ottomans in 
1917, the British maintained this communal system, and in 1948, Israel adopted a 
similar approach.80 For example, the state has no mechanism for civil marriage, 
since quasi-independent courts exercise jurisdiction over marriage, divorce, 
adoption, and inheritance for each religious community. Indeed, there are a 
myriad of contexts in which Israeli law defers to cultural autonomy, although I 
will not discuss them at length here. Suffice it to say that in the aforementioned 
cases and several others, ethnoreligious groups in Israel “compete with the state 
for the right to exercise coercive authority” over individuals whom they view as 
members.81  
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One would certainly not say the same about the United States, as this sort 
of competition is at odds with a conception of pluralism that deals primarily in 
the language of protecting individual rights from the state. In rejecting the notion 
that Israel should mandate compliance with various parts of Jewish law, H.L.A. 
Hart—one of Britain’s most distinguished legal philosophers—had this to say: 
Where it impinges on moral judgment and denies desirable human 
liberties, I would subordinate the cultural aspects to the liberal 
principles, which are prima facie principles. Giving cultural 
consideration absolute priority would lead to a substantial retreat 
from the liberal conception of human rights and individual 
liberties.82 
 
In a narrow sense, this is a normative rebuke of Israel as a de jure Jewish State, 
but it could also function as a liberal basis for repudiating group-rights pluralism 
more broadly.83 Indeed, Hart might say that by walling off separate communities 
in this manner, Israel is flirting with moral relativism, and this might have 
positively nefarious consequences. As Will Kymlicka and Raphael Cohen-
Almagor suggest, “Some things lie beyond the ability of liberal democracies to 
tolerate.”84 By letting a particular group’s cultural views usurp broader normative 
principles, the state might be forced to accept a dangerously patriarchal culture 
where parents do not teach their daughters how to read, for example. In this vein, 
Kymlicka and Cohen-Almagor continue, “Democracy cannot endure norms that 
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deny respect to people and that are designed to harm others, although they might 
be dictated by some cultures.”85 
However, the Israeli Supreme Court has largely been able to avoid this 
slippage into hands-off relativism. For example, in Dalal Rassi v. Attorney-
General (1953), a teacher in an Arab school had inflicted severe corporal 
punishment on a student, and the defendant invoked cultural autonomy in an 
argument before the Court. After stating that “the Court will always give full 
consideration to the effect of customs and traditions which have been accepted by 
[a given group] as forming part of their way of life," they applied a national 
standard for severe corporal punishment, stating that punishments “are not 
matters affecting merely an individual...or a particular section of the community. 
They affect the State as a whole, the community as a whole.”86 The legal 
reasoning here is clear and emphatic, and it begins to explain the evolution of the 
Israeli polity. Yet while the avoidance of relativism is somewhat comforting from 
a liberal-democratic point of view, the trouble with group rights in Israel arises 
from the basic, pervasive linkage between Judaism and full citizenship. 
Nationality in Israel is decisively not synonymous with citizenship; being a 
part of the Israeli nation involves being part of a specific ethno-religious group. 
In the same vein, being a part of the state—which merely requires the formal, 
procedural elements of citizenship—is not the same as being a part of the nation. 
There is a powerful argument to be made that in terms of one’s attachment to the 
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political community, only Jewish Israelis can be members of the nation in full 
standing. As Jacobsohn eloquently puts it, “Where religion...is so fundamentally 
entwined in conceptions of national identity, the insistence...that there be no 
‘governmental entanglement’ in religion has an air of unreality about it.”87 Taking 
this a step further, Jacobsohn later asserts: 
Whatever the degree of ethnoreligious autonomy (and legal equality) 
in Israel, it is not accompanied by real equality among officially 
recognized groups. Israel's Jewish community obviously enjoys a 
privileged status in a state whose raison d'etre is that it be the 
homeland for the Jewish people.88 
 
In other words, because it turns on constitutional self-understandings, 
nationality is not necessarily equivalent to citizenship. In a significant sense, 
Arab-Israelis (and other non-Jewish Israelis) are automatically outsiders by 
virtue of who they are, and because the “who” is based on ascriptive 
characteristics, their status is something they cannot change. Again, a 
comparison to the American understanding of citizenship proves useful in 
drawing out this point. 
As Philip Gleason puts it, “The United States defined itself as a nation by 
commitment to the principles of liberty, equality, and government on the basis of 
consent, and the nationality of its people derived from their identification with 
those principles.”89 As Jacobsohn is careful to point out, “resources, public and 
private, are committed to the task of converting a country of immigrants into a 
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national community.”90 In stark contrast, an Israeli citizen’s “Jewishness” 
determines whether she is truly a member of the nation, and that polity is, to 
some extent, uninterested in welcoming anybody into the national community if 
they were not born into it. This is precisely what is at issue in the nation-state 
bill’s most famous provision: “The right of national self-determination in the 
State of Israel is unique to the Jewish people.”  
Yael Tamir’s work is particularly useful here. She defines the right to 
national self-determination as “the right to preserve the existence of a nation as a 
distinct cultural entity,” and allows for some degree of cultural deference in 
pursuit of this end. Tamir goes on to insist that nationalism—even ethno-
religious nationalism—is not only compatible with liberalism, but that the 
underlying bonds it creates can even enrich it. However, it is crucial to 
understand that this argument relies on important limitations for what this 
cultural deference can entail; if the state ties a robust sense of belonging to a 
particular ascriptive identity, this falls outside the scope of what Tamir calls 
“liberal nationalism.”91 Hypothetically, if Israel were entirely (or almost entirely) 
made up of Jewish citizens, the state may have been able to maintain a “thick” 
state religion while remaining true to liberal democratic principles. However, this 
is not the case. There are many other ethnic and religious groups with deep, 
profound ties to the land, and excluding them or actively seeking the erasure of 
important elements of these groups’ identities cannot be reconciled with 
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democracy properly understood. In other words, being a liberal state for only 
some of your citizens is a contradiction in terms, no matter which way you slice 
it.92  
In this respect, Will Kymlicka and Raphael Cohen-Almagor develop a very 
useful distinction between formal and full citizenship. In their words: 
Israel is a binational state [and] the liberal formula they seek to advance is 
‘live and let live’...Formally, the Israeli-Palestinians are considered to 
enjoy equal liberties as the Jewish community, [but] in practice they do 
not share and enjoy the same rights and burdens. Moreover, they have to 
live with some limitations on their freedoms, which the Jewish majority 
does not.93  
 
Securing purely formal citizenship for some and full citizenship for others 
violates the principle of equal citizenship, and thus, is almost by definition 
illiberal.94 Moreover, as I alluded to above, it is unclear whether an Arab-Israeli 
could even become Jewish through conversion—Jewish in terms of becoming a 
member of the community and assuming full citizenship—if she wanted to.95 In 
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this vein, there are two landmark Israeli Supreme Court cases that endeavor to 
answer the question “Who is a Jew?” 
Commonly referred to as the “Brother Daniel” case, the first major judicial 
pronouncement on Judaism was Rufeisen v. Minister of Interior (1962), which 
helped elucidate who is not a Jew under Israeli law.96 Born to a Jewish mother, 
Oswald Rufeisen was a hero in Israel. During World War II, he spent years 
working in Poland as an interpreter for the German police, courageously posing 
as a Silesian Christian in order to save hundreds of Jews from the Nazi death 
camps.97 Eventually, he was discovered and thrown in prison, but he managed to 
escape, and found refuge in a convent. Here, he converted to Christianity, and 
eventually joined the Carmelite order in the hopes that he would someday serve 
in Palestine. However, when he attempted to claim his automatic citizenship 
under the Law of Return,98 his request was rejected by the minister of interior. 
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In his testimony before the Israeli Supreme Court, Rufeisen argued that 
his nationality was still Jewish. In his words, “If I am not a Jew what am I?  I did 
not accept Christianity to leave my people. It added to my Judaism. I feel as a 
Jew.”99 Interestingly enough, if the Court had adopted the Orthodox definition of 
Judaism, Rufeisen would have had no trouble establishing his “Jewishness,” as 
nothing could change the fact of his birth to a Jewish mother. Unfortunately for 
him, the Court elected to adopt a secular understanding, which was to be derived 
from an intuitive notion of the “ordinary simple Jew” in “common parlance.” 100 
Again, Jacobsohn explains this well:  
Whatever the Court’s own views of the matter might be, the only 
definition that counts is the one that expresses itself in ‘the common 
parlance’ of the Jewish community. [The Court] concluded that the 
communal understanding of the term does not include a Jew who has 
become a Christian...History, as employed by the Court, possesses a 
cold logic of exclusivity—you are either a part of it or you are not...the 
conditions and criteria for fraternity….ultimately depend on the 
manner in which people connect to a communal past.101  
 
In delivering their verdict, the judges were clearly distressed at the prospect of 
denying Brother Daniel entry into the Israeli polity. However, they were well 
aware that the case would set a powerful precedent, and the Court worried that 
granting him citizenship would effectively “erase the historical and sanctified 
[meaning] of the word ‘Jew.’”102 In the words of Justice Silberg, “Certainly 
Brother Daniel will love Israel. This he has proved beyond all doubt. But such 
love will be from without—the love of a distant brother. He will not be a true 
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inherent part of the Jewish world.”103 For the Court, the bottom line was that 
Brother Daniel renounced his Judaism when he converted. 
 Of course, deciding who is not a Jew doesn’t necessarily point to a positive 
definition. Five years later, Shalit v. Minister of Interior (1970) did just that. 
Benjamin Shalit was a native-born Israeli Jew, and his wife was a non-Jewish 
naturalized Israeli citizen. The two were nonbelievers, and they sought to have 
their two children registered as “of Jewish nationality and without religion” in the 
Population Register. When a clerk of the Ministry of Interior refused to register 
them in this way, the Shalits sued.104 At its core, the case involved deciding 
whether the status of “Jewishness” could be separated from any religious content: 
Did the fact that the Shalits were non-believers mean they were not Jewish under 
the law? 
 The significance of this decision did not escape the Supreme Court, and 
this was the first time in Israeli history that the judiciary convened a tribunal of 
nine justices—all of whom contributed opinions. Although the Court ruled in 
Shalit’s favor, the decision was largely on technical grounds. Still, the decision 
prompted an incendiary response from Orthodox Jews in the Knesset, who 
threatened to bring down the coalition government. Soon afterwards, the Knesset 
passed a law directly addressing the Court’s decision, amending the Law of 
Return to define a Jew as “a person who was born of a Jewish mother or has 
become converted to Judaism and who is not a member of another religion." As a 
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result, the notion that religion and nationality could be separated was effectively 
rejected.105 
Together, Rufeisen and Shalit form a membership test that subordinates 
present intention to past affiliation.106 There are ways in which Israel’s 
“Jewishness” might have been brought into the fold without trampling on liberal 
or democratic principles. In other words, I reject H. N. Hirsch’s categorical 
assertion that, “The longing for community is a chimera—romantic, naive, and in 
the end, illiberal and dangerous.”107 But as Jacobsohn reminds us, “The critical 
constitutional question for Israel involves a determination of the strength of its 
communitarian commitment.”108 We should avoid a heavy-handed rejection of 
“thick” culture, but we should also guard against the illiberal tendencies it may 
bring. In Israel, what matters is who you are, not what you profess. In a 1988 
article, Liebman captured the problem: 
Community, on the other hand, is personal. Built on status, on past 
performance and future expectations, on degrees of kinship ties, on 
loyalty and commitment, it suggests that not all are equal. Since 
membership in the community of Israelis is defined by Jewish 
identity, the non-Jewish minorities, almost by definition become 
second-class citizens.109  
 
Moreover, there remains a question of whether converts can ever be Jewish in the 
full sense of the term, insofar as the religion is a source of bonding or group-
identification. All of this points to the conclusion that the barrier to entry into the 
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national community in Israel is near-impermeable for anybody who was not born 
Jewish. No matter how thoroughly Arab-Israelis might wish to be part of the 
nation that governs them, they are at best tolerated—belonging as a member in 
full standing is simply not a substantive option.  
 
C. Back to the Bill 
Now that we have established a normative and theoretical framework for 
the problem of Israeli civic identity, let us return to the nation-state bill’s 
symbolically exclusionary provisions. The flag, of course, is white with a Star of 
David in the middle and two blue stripes running along the top and bottom. The 
association with the Star of David is a clear demonstration of the state’s Judaism, 
but the blue stripes symbolize a subtler, if ultimately similar, allusion. Among 
European Jews, the most common Jewish prayer shawls (known as the tallit in 
Hebrew) were white with the flag’s iconic light blue stripes, which is where Israel 
Belkind, founder of the Bilu movement, got the inspiration for the Zionist Flag he 
first flew in 1885.110 A series of adaptations ensued, but Belkind’s flag—and its 
religious symbolism—was ultimately the basis for the Israeli flag adopted in 
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1948.111 The state symbol is a seven-branched menorah with olive branches on 
either side and the word “Israel” at its base, implying that Judaism is both an 
inherent part of the Israeli national ethos and that the religion is, in a powerful 
sense, representative of the state itself.112 Once again, it is not difficult to see why 
non-Jewish Israelis have difficulty identifying with this state symbol, and the 
nation-state bill elevates both the flag and the menorah to constitutional 
significance for the first time in Israeli history. 
However, of all the nation-state’s symbolic provisions, the most pervasive 
form of exclusion might be the national anthem, “Hatikvah.” As opposed to the 
state symbol or the flag, a state’s national anthem requires active participation in 
certain contexts, and that is especially problematic when the lyrics systematically 
alienate one of the state’s large minority groups.113 The anthem’s Hebrew title 
directly translates to “The Hope,” and some of its most commonly quoted phrases 
should explain the culture of exclusion in this context: it invokes “the hope two 
thousand years old,” and the “yearning of the Jewish soul” to be “a free nation in 
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our land, the land of Zion and Jerusalem.”114 The anthem clearly connects with 
Jewish Israelis, as it evokes their long and troubled history in a powerful way.  
However, tracing one’s culture and lineage to the land of Zion is not 
unique to the Jewish people. And while Arab-Israelis are not legally required to 
sing the national anthem, its words completely ignore their history—and to some 
extent the very fact of their existence as citizens of Israel—although for this 
minority, this land is also their land.115 Moreover, the lyrics preclude Arab-
Israelis from substantive connection to the state following a major national 
tragedy or celebration; in these contexts, enabling this sort of fellow-feeling 
would otherwise help bind Israeli citizens together, but the exclusion of one 
people’s entire historical and cultural narrative only highlights the “formal” 
nature of their citizenship.116 Avishai Margalit and Moshe Halbertal capture the 
problem with Israel’s anthem succinctly and powerfully: “the Arab 
community...is not included in Israel’s civil religion.”117  
This exclusion is not merely theoretical, and indeed, it has impacted the 
way some Israelis see certain public officials, as well as how those officials (and 
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Israeli members of their minority group) see the polity as a whole.118 For 
example, in 2001 Saleh Tarif, the first non-Jewish cabinet minister in Israeli 
history, refused to sing “Hatikvah.” As an Arab member of the Druse community, 
he commented, “Do you really think I could stand there and sing, ‘So long as 
within our breasts the Jewish heart beats true? It is the Jewish anthem, it is not 
the anthem of the non-Jewish citizens of Israel.”119 In a similar vein, after Ghaleb 
Majadale became Israel’s first Muslim minister in the Israeli cabinet in 2007, he 
said, “I fail to understand how an enlightened, sane Jew allows himself to ask a 
Muslim person with a different language and culture to sing an anthem that was 
written for Jews only.”120 Enlightened and sane or not, many prominent Jewish 
politicians have done exactly that, even berating non-Jewish officials for their 
silence. When the first Arab-Israeli to sit on the Supreme Court, Justice Salim 
Joubran, refused to sing the anthem during the chief justice’s retirement 
ceremony, far-right Yisrael Beiteinu MK David Rotem called for his resignation. 
In Rotem’s words, Justice Joubran “spat in the face of Israel,” and the MK went 
on to assert that those who object to the Zionist hymn “can find a state with a 
more appropriate anthem and move there.”121  
                                               
118 In turn, this has impacted the way these public officials—as well as members of the minority 
groups to which they belong—see the Israeli polity. 
119 "Behind the Headlines: Not All Israeli Arabs Cheer Appointment of Druse Minister," last 
modified May 6, 2001, accessed April 23, 2018, 
https://archive.jta.org/2001/03/06/archive/behind-the-headlines-not-all-israeli-arabs-cheer-
appointment-of-druse-minister. 
120"Majadele Refuses to Sing National Anthem," Ynetnews, accessed April 23, 2018, 
https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3377681,00.html. 
121 Ethan Bronner, "Anger and Compassion for Justice Who Stays Silent During Hymn," The New 
York Times, March 04, 2012, accessed April 23, 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/05/world/middleeast/anger-and-compassion-for-justice-
who-stays-silent-during-zionist-hymn.html. 
49 
 
Fortunately, some prominent Israeli officials like Reuven Rivlin (Knesset 
Speaker at the time, now President of Israel) and Vice Prime Minister Moshe 
Ya'alon came to Joubran’s defense. Indeed, in 2016 President Rivlin publicly 
supported altering the national anthem so that non-Jewish Israelis who serve 
their country can identify with its lyrics. Responding to an Arab high-school 
student, Rivlin said, ““The question you are asking needs to be on the national 
agenda in the next generation or two. This is a dilemma we can’t ignore...I await 
the day that every Israeli citizen can identify with the State of Israel.”122 However, 
while symbolic exclusion absolutely undermines the citizenship of non-Jews in 
Israel, the nation-state bill also both creates and reinforces several other, more 
concrete examples of second-class citizenship. As former Minister Majadele put 
it, “Before we talk about symbols, I want to talk about equal education for my 
children. It's more important that my son would be able to buy a house, live with 
dignity…the Arabs are not in a mood to sing right now."123  In chapter 3, I will 
discuss the allusion Majadele is making to disparities in political rights between 
Arab-Israelis and their Jewish counterparts. But for now, let us continue our 
discussion of the nation-state bill.  
Jewish citizens’ privileged status in Israel is quite clear when it comes to 
education, and the future Basic Law cements that privileged status as part of the 
state’s basic structure. In Arab schools within Israel, students must learn Hebrew 
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and study Jewish subjects, but there is no corresponding requirement for 
biculturalism in Jewish schools, where exposure to Arab history and culture is 
extremely limited. As of this moment, based on available information about the 
near-final version, the section of the nation-state bill that reads “the history of the 
Jewish people, its heritage and its traditions shall be taught in all educational 
institutions serving the Jewish public” has not been dropped.124 Read within the 
context of the rest of the bill (particularly the next Article on the “Preservation of 
Culture, Heritage, and Identity,” which I will discuss below) as well as the current 
state of affairs in Israeli education, the legislation appears poised to transform 
what may have been a de facto erasure of the Palestinian or Arab narrative into 
an enduring and constitutionally mandated one.125  
Again, a comparison to the American system is helpful in demonstrating 
why the Israeli approach undercuts liberal-democratic principles. In schools 
across the country, non-Jewish Israelis are taught that the Jewish history is the 
history of the Israeli nation, and if you fall on the wrong side of it—a matter in 
which you have little to no choice—you are not truly Israeli. In an American 
school, the parallel case would be something like this: what is important about 
George Washington is the fact that he was white and Christian, and you can only 
claim him as part of your heritage if you too are white and Christian. Of course, 
this is not what one learns about Washington, but what is less obvious is the fact 
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that this is not accidental. Like the rest of our Founding Fathers, any individual 
can claim Washington as informing her identity, and thus her connection to the 
nation, by accepting the ideas he represents. The American apple of gold and our 
picture of silver both ensure that even as an ascriptive “outsider” you can choose 
to adopt the American Creed.126  
Consider Samuel Huntington’s argument in “The Hispanic Challenge,” for 
example, where he warns against “the persistent inflow” of Mexicans and other 
Latinos. Huntington bends over backwards to insist that it is not these 
immigrants’  ascriptive differences that separate them from “real Americans,” but 
rather their resistance to the specific values—Protestant individualism, work 
ethic, and the rule of law, among others—that have built the American dream. In 
other words, Huntington’s worry is not merely that there are too many 
immigrants, but that they refuse to endorse American culture. What gives this 
claim “bite” is that the immigrants actually have a substantive choice to do the 
opposite.  
The final provision I will discuss in this section is Article IV’s demotion of 
Arabic from one of the state’s official languages (alongside Hebrew) to a language 
with “special standing.” The meaning of this provision is somewhat unclear, but 
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the phrasing in the original nation-state bill looks like this: 
 
IV Language 
1. Hebrew is the state language. 
2. Arabic shall have a special standing in the state; those who speak Arabic 
shall have access in their own language to State services, all as prescribed 
by law. 
 
The first thing to notice here is both implicit and obvious: Hebrew is 
presented as the state language, to the exclusion of any other. Second, the 
legislation is careful to emphasize that the practical, day-to-day implications of 
this change will be minimal: Arabic-speakers will still be able to acquire State 
services by using their own language. Although the full text of the latest draft has 
not yet been released to the public, the Jerusalem Post recently reported that 
some of the phrasing had shifted: “Arabic has a special status in the state [and] 
its speakers have a right to language accessibility in state services.” 127 Explicitly 
granting Arabic-speakers a right to language accessibility is a significant 
rhetorical change from stating that they “shall have access” to state services in 
their language “as prescribed by law”—laws, of course, can change fairly easily, 
especially if they do not tread on any specifically enumerated rights. Moreover, 
the Post reports that this draft includes a new sub-article stating that the Basic 
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Law will not detract from the current status of the Arabic language.128 However, 
the language provision was one of the left’s primary points of criticism 
immediately after the 2018 compromise was reached.  
The obvious question is: Why? It is important to note that the Arabic 
language is already invisible in most public spaces in Israel, so the practical 
consequences were never very important.129 The most important element of this 
provision remains its symbolic significance. Arabic was an official language in the 
region even prior to the British Mandate, when Hebrew was elevated to that 
status.130 Moreover, the Israeli legislature established the two languages as equal 
under the law with the Law and Administration Ordinance, enacted immediately 
after Israel’s establishment.131 Setting Hebrew apart from all other languages as 
“the language of the state” undermines what Avishai Margalit and Moshe 
Halbertal call Israeli-Arabs’ “right to culture” at an important national and 
cultural crossroads.132 This provision of the nation-state bill is intended to convey 
that those with a historical and cultural connection to the language of Judaism 
“belong” in the state more than those who do not.133 Despite the softened 
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rhetoric, the near-final iteration of this legislation, which will soon become a 
Basic Law, still sends exactly the same message. 
 From a historical perspective, there appears to have been a tug-of-war over 
the primacy of Hebrew in Israeli society. Interestingly enough, this is most 
obvious in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. In “Israel as a Nation-State in 
Supreme Court Rulings,” Aviad Bakshi and Gideon Sapir describe how during the 
state’s early years, the Court clearly awarded Hebrew a “senior status.” 
Specifically, they cite Khaa v. Jerusalem Municipality (1955), El-Chuari v. 
Chairman of Nazareth Municipality Election committee, and Chalaf v. The 
North County Committee for Planning and Construction to demonstrate that for 
nearly forty years following Israel’s establishment, Arabic did not enjoy equal 
status with Hebrew.134 These cases demonstrate this trend, because in each of 
them, in order to receive a remedy from the Court the petitioner had to prove that 
the failure to publish in Arabic actually prevented a citizen from having access to 
the relevant information.135 
 Bakshi and Sapir go on to describe how this trend changed beginning in 
the early 1990s, when the Court eroded the status of Hebrew. In Jerusalem 
Community Burial Society v. Kastenbaum (1992), Justice Barak held that the 
rights of a deceased person and her relatives outweighed the interest of 
protecting the status of Hebrew. This decision is quite understandable, however, 
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when viewed within the Court’s desire to protect human dignity. Eighteen 
months after this ruling, the Court was again forced to consider the special status 
of Hebrew as a “national value.” However, in this case the Court prioritized the 
freedom of commercial expression instead of human dignity. In Engineers v. 
Nazareth Eilit Municipality (1993), commonly known as the Re’em case, the 
Court struck down a municipality bylaw that mandated private posters on city 
bulletin boards reserve at least two-thirds of their space for Hebrew. The final 
case they cite, Mareei v. Savek (1999) comes before the Court as a result of 
almost unbelievable circumstances: 
The Knesset Elections Law requires the use of a Hebrew letter on 
the paper ballots in the general elections. A similar arrangement 
also applies in the elections to the Local Authorities. Towards the 
end of the 1990s, the court was requested to determine the outcome 
of elections in a certain local authority that were decided by one 
vote. One paper ballot on which there was only a handwritten 
Arabic letter for a given ticket, without the addition of a Hebrew 
letter on it, had been counted in these elections. Justice Heshin 
determined, with the majority opinion, that the main purpose of the 
legislation is the realization of the voter’s will, so one is required to 
respect the wish of the voter who expressed his opinion in the 
Arabic language. This ruling, too, erodes the senior status granted 
by the legislature to the Hebrew language.136 
 
As the authors put it, in all three cases, “Opposite the right to freedom of speech, 
Barak set the interest in nurturing the Hebrew language as a national value, but 
he determined that on balance, the right takes precedent.”137 In other words, it 
appeared that the Court was swinging back in the direction of liberal-democratic 
principles. 
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Yet in 2002, Adalah—The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, 
petitioned the Supreme Court to regularize the use of Arabic in Israeli court 
proceedings. This was quite an alarming request, as demonstrated by the fact that 
the Court advised the organization to withdraw its petition, and it soon did so. 
The case was entitled Adalah v. Courts Administrator, and it was ultimately 
unpublished. While it is not as definitive as the cases cited above, at the very 
least, this represents a counter-swing away from “eroding” the status of Hebrew. 
In this context, the nation-state bill’s provision on state languages can be 
understood as reifying this more recent trend, which is compounded by 
contemporary structural dynamics affecting the Supreme Court. It is these 
dynamics to which I now turn. 
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Chapter 3: Between Judges, Politicians, and the People—Structural 
Barriers to Judicial Activism 
 
 
“What can the court contribute to the solution of an ideological dispute such as 
this which divides the public? The answer is— nothing, and whoever expects 
judges to produce a magic formula is merely deluding himself in his naiveté.”138 
- Justice Landau 
 
“This much I think I do know, that a society so riven that the spirit of moderation 
is gone, no constitution can save. That a society where that spirit flourishes, no 
constitution need save. That a society which evades its responsibility by thrusting 
upon the court the nurture of that spirit, in the end will perish.”139 
- Judge Learned Hand 
 
“The Supreme Court is not the enemy of the people. It's important to understand 
that hurting the Supreme Court is hurting democracy, and hurting democracy 
means hurting disadvantaged populations.”140 
- Justice Salim Joubran 
 
 
 In this chapter, I will argue that the Israeli Supreme Court is not, and 
never has been, well-positioned to act as a “republican schoolmaster” for the 
state. Moreover, if the Court hopes to protect liberal-democratic principles within 
Israel’s current socio-political climate, it appears that the judiciary’s only option 
is to exercise restraint in all but the most egregious cases. To some extent, this 
will help protect the Court’s broad power of judicial review—which remains 
intact, at least in principle—from encroachment by the Knesset. Nevertheless, if 
the rest of the Israeli polity is moving towards reliably and consistently 
prioritizing the state’s Jewish identity over its liberal-democratic commitments, 
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with certain exceptions, the Court will have to acquiesce in the long run. While I 
will not definitively assert that we are witnessing the beginnings of a 
transformative shift in Israeli Constitutionalism—one that establishes the 
preeminence of the state’s Jewish identity—I would not be surprised if this is how 
tomorrow’s historians characterize the contemporary evolution of the state’s 
socio-political system. 
 
A. The Changing Politics of Appointments and the Move Towards Restraint 
In addition to the factors described in the previous sub-section, the 
changing politics of appointments will make the Supreme Court much less likely 
to overrule government policies via judicial review. Indeed, the revamped 
appointment process is the preeminent structural mechanism for reigning in 
judicial activism. The new framework drastically reduces the Court’s influence on 
selecting Justices while also powerfully politicizing the appointment process. In 
relation to the first of these two factors, future policies may continue to erode the 
sitting justices’ influence on Court appointments. As I will argue, each of these 
developments contributes to the Court’s movement toward judicial restraint, and 
this shift away from activism is clearly demonstrated by the ideological bent of 
nominees and selections to the Court in recent years. Examining the evolution of 
the appointment process will provide necessary context for understanding the 
significance of the most recent structural changes, and it will also help set the 
stage for discussing the ways in which further politicizing the Court might shape 
future jurisprudence.  
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First, we should establish the basic factors involved in the appointment 
process. Under Israeli law, the Judicial Selection Committee is in charge of 
making permanent appointments to the Supreme Court. This nine-person 
committee is made up of the chief justice, two other sitting justices (appointed on 
a rotating basis), two government Ministers, two MKs, and two representatives of 
the Israeli Bar Association. The Knesset traditionally selects one member of the 
opposition and one member of the coalition government, meaning that in theory, 
the two will neutralize one another, and most of the time, the Bar representatives 
support the sitting justices.141 For much of Israeli history, when it was announced 
that the Supreme Court justices would support a particular candidate, the rest of 
Committee served as nothing more than a rubber stamp.142 
However, times have changed. Between 2004 and 2007, six justices 
retired from the Court after reaching the mandatory retirement age of seventy: 
Theodor Or, Dali Dorner, Eliahu Mazza, Jacob Turkel, Mishael Cheshin, and, of 
course, Aharon Barak himself. As Friedmann puts it, “All these were central 
figures, and, without them, the [C]ourt looked somewhat anemic.”143 More 
importantly, “The unreserved confidence and respect that the Supreme Court had 
previously enjoyed among the public and politicians had evaporated. Under the 
Barak court, the appointments procedure became controversial.”144 
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The declining public trust in the Supreme Court has a clear empirical 
basis. Unfortunately, while the Israeli Democracy Institute has consistently asked 
about trust in institutions, the only available data is presented in a segmented 
fashion—sometimes only discussing Jewish public opinion, and other times 
describing views of the entire population—making a single figure difficult to 
construct. Nevertheless, by looking at data from Jewish respondents, the trends 
regarding Israeli public opinion should be clear enough. In 1995, 85% of Jewish 
respondents in Israel said they trusted the Court “fully,” while 10% trusted the 
institution “somewhat,” and only 5% said they did not trust it.145 This is quite a 
high baseline, although answers cannot be directly compared with later data 
because public trust is measured by different categories. By 2003, this group’s 
faith in the institution dropped markedly, and the trend continued through 2008. 
Below, I have reconstructed a graph illustrating this trend, which I present 
alongside public opinion regarding both the Knesset and the government as a 
whole for context.146 
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Again, the downward trend in the early 2000s is quite clear, even absent data 
points from earlier in Barak’s term, which would make the drop-off appear 
significantly more striking. Another survey shows that during the middle of 
Barak’s term in 2000, 71% of Jewish respondents said they trusted the Court, and 
71% of Jewish respondents agreed that the courts perform their tasks fairly; just 
seven years later, this figure plummeted to a mere 48%.147 Finally, in 2017, when 
asked whether they believe the power of judicial review over Knesset legislation 
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should be taken away from the Supreme Court, 58% of the general public did not 
agree while a shockingly high 36% agreed.148 
Due to a combination of declining public trust and the loss of several key 
justices, the judiciary was vulnerable. Several structural components of the 
Supreme Court appointment process have been altered in the past decade, and 
some of the most transformational changes were either initiated or supported by 
former Justice Minister Daniel Friedmann, who served from 2007-2009. While 
there had been many draft bills and resolutions attempting to increase the 
government’s influence on the Court, in his 2016 book “The Purse and the Sword: 
The Trials of Israel’s Legal Revolution,” Friedmann details precisely how he 
helped bring about a significant and lasting shift in the appointment process. 
Because justice ministers tend not to last long in today’s Israel, the status quo put 
the sitting justices at a powerful structural advantage. As Friedman writes, “New 
elections were on the horizon,” and as “has happened at other junctures when the 
high bench found itself facing an independent-minded justice minister. All they 
needed was a bit of patience. But this time, it didn’t work.”149 
One distinctive characteristic of the old selection process in Israel was the 
practice of making temporary appointments. Essentially, the justice minister has 
the power to make one-year appointments to the Court without requiring the 
approval of the Judicial Selection Committee, provided that he or she had the 
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chief justice’s approval. Additionally, only sitting District Court judges were 
eligible for these temporary appointments. Up to three or four District Court 
judges could be cycled through for short periods of time to fill a Supreme Court 
vacancy before a permanent appointment was made. As Friedmann notes, this 
arrangement was unique to Israel’s highest court, making it something of an 
anomaly in a comparative constitutional context.  
And this, it seems, is for good reason. Indeed, Friedmann points to several 
worrying implications of this procedure, although I will only highlight three. 
First, this would disrupt the work of the District Court, due to the judge’s absence 
as well as the fact that temporary judges who did not then secure a permanent 
position often felt publicly insulted, driving some of the District Court’s top 
judges to resign. Second, the revolving-door phenomenon created perverse power 
dynamics among supposedly equal judges, and this tiered system often led 
temporary justices to defer to their permanent counterparts in hopes of reaching 
that status. As Friedmann puts it, “Their independence of judgement was open to 
question.”150 While this second factor was extremely problematic, insofar as it 
corrupted the judges’ impartiality, from Friedmann’s point of view, the third 
factor was just as pernicious.  
The chief justices instituted a “rule” under which no District Court judge 
could be appointed to the Supreme Court without having first served in a 
temporary capacity. This rule was of course not imposed on Supreme Court 
appointees who did not begin in the lower courts, meaning “judges with years of 
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experience on the bench needed to undergo an ‘apprenticeship’ when men and 
women who had never served as judges took up their gavels directly.”151 On its 
face, this arrangement seems somewhat arbitrary, but it had important 
implications for the appointment process more broadly. While the apprenticeship 
“rule” (perhaps better-termed “tradition”) had no basis in law, on Friedmann’s 
account, it helped “the justices wield nearly exclusive power over appointments” 
in practice.152 In essence, this arrangement granted the chief justice de facto veto 
power over the appointment of judges from the lower courts, in addition to the 
substantial power the Court already exercised on the Judicial Selection 
Committee, where sitting justices held three of the nine seats. 
As Justice Minister, Friedmann set out to dismantle the temporary 
appointment regime. Initially, he decided that the appointment procedure as a 
whole needed to be codified, and when he submitted a proposal that did away 
with temporary appointments, the Justice Minister felt immediate pushback. 
Ehud Barak first asked Prime Minister Olmert to demand Friedmann withdraw 
the bill, and when Olmert refused, Barak called Friedmann himself. The Justice 
Minister saw no reason to acquiesce, given that Barak had not been particularly 
cooperative and the Ministerial Committee on Legislation (to whom Friedmann 
had submitted the bill) overwhelmingly supported his proposal.153 However, 
Labor representative Shalom Simhon suggested a compromise and Friedmann 
agreed, staving off legislative reform at least for the time being. Nevertheless, 
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Friedman continued to refuse temporary appointments, and he recommended 
that his successor, Yaakov Neeman, continue this policy. Although Chief Justice 
Beinisch refused to support any District Court judges who hadn’t served 
temporarily, more and more top-rate judges from the lower Court agreed to have 
their names put forward for consideration. Understandably, most of the District 
Court judges had always despised the arrangement, but now they saw a real 
possibility that the system requiring “trial runs” would come to an end.154 In 
practice, this put an end to temporary appointments, taking a substantial degree 
of appointment power away from the sitting members of the Court.155 The Israeli 
Supreme Court is one of the busiest in the world, so when retirements open up 
enough vacancies on the bench, other members of the Judicial Selection 
Committee can now force the hand of the three sitting justices.156 
Another important reform that occurred during Friedmann’s tenure was a 
bill submitted to the Knesset’s Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee. 
Authored by Likud MK Gideon Sa’ar, the proposal would require that Supreme 
Court appointments only be made with seven of the Selection Committees nine 
votes. The Justice Minister decided to support the bill, and Amendment No.55 to 
the Courts Law was enacted.157 As Friedmann points out, this meant that neither 
the sitting justice minister nor the chief justice could push through an 
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appointment without approval from the other, since both of them could almost 
always count on support from two other committee members. Thus, a three-
person bloc could effectively veto any candidate not to their liking.158 In practice, 
this reform forces negotiation as well as some degree of compromise and 
consensus between the Selection Committee’s two major players. It also carves 
out a space for maintaining some of the Court’s influence over permanent 
appointments; without this law, ending the temporary appointments regime 
would have left the three sitting justices with exactly as much leverage as any 
other member of the committee.  
Nevertheless, the changing dynamics have, overall, much diminished the 
Court’s power in Supreme Court appointments. When Justice Minister Neeman 
forced Chief Justice Beinisch to appoint Neal Hendel—a candidate she previously 
categorically rejected, even for a temporary position—as part of a three-
appointment compromise, “It was apparently the first time in the history of the 
Supreme Court that a chief justice was compelled to accept the appointment of a 
candidate she emphatically opposed.”159 Whether or not this was in fact the first 
time a chief justice had been strong-armed, it has happened several times since, 
with potentially serious consequences. 
 For a concrete demonstration of this new reality and how it reflects the 
changing politics of Israeli Supreme Court appointments, let us examine a few 
recent appointments as well as the appointees’ respective ideological leanings 
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and legal approaches. In February of 2017, the Judicial Selection Committee 
appointed David Mintz, Yael Willner, Yosef Elron, and George Kara to replace 
four outgoing justices on the 15-member Supreme Court. These justices were 
selected from a shortlist of 27 candidates, and three of the four were on right-
wing Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked’s list of preferred candidates. Her top pick 
was likely David Mintz, former district judge of Jerusalem and a staunch 
conservative, but she was also pleased with the appointments of Yosef Elron and 
Yael Willner; the former has a track record of judicial restraint, and the latter is 
known as a (relatively moderate) religious Zionist.160 Voting as a bloc, the three 
Supreme Court justices serving on the Judicial Appointments Committee were 
unable to advance any of their preferred nominees. The final selection, George 
Kara, is a well-known Christian Arab judge from the Tel Aviv District Court, and 
for a variety of reasons he was seen as a compromise candidate.161 Of course, the 
2017 round of appointments dramatically shifted the Court’s ideological makeup 
in Shaked’s preferred direction; the Court became considerably more non-
activist, conservative, and nationalist. The Justice Minister hailed it as a historic 
day, commenting, “Finally, a humane and judicious selection that is needed as a 
mirror for the Israeli people.”162 
                                               
160 Raoul Wootliff, "4 New Supreme Court Judges Tapped, as Right Starts to Shift Bench," The 
Times of Israel, February 23, 2017, accessed April 23, 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/new-
supreme-court-judges-tapped-as-right-looks-to-shift-bench/.  
161 Raoul Wootliff, "4 New Supreme Court Judges Tapped, as Right Starts to Shift Bench," The 
Times of Israel, February 23, 2017, accessed April 23, 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/new-
supreme-court-judges-tapped-as-right-looks-to-shift-bench/.  
162 I will soon return to the claim that these selections “mirror” the desires of the Israeli people, 
but for now, suffice it to say that Shaked’s choice of metaphor is both intentional and informative. 
68 
 
This movement toward a less-interventionist, more conservative, and 
more nationalist Supreme Court continued in February of this year. In different 
ways, Justice Uri Shoham and Justice Yoram Danzinger are both considered 
judicial activists, and upon their retirement, the Judicial Selection Committee 
appointed Alex Stein and Ofer Grosskopf to the Court. Stein was Justice Minister 
Shaked’s top choice, and for good reason; he is a very widely respected legal 
scholar, and some conservatives believe he will be able to take apart the 
underpinnings of Barak’s “constitutional revolution” by crafting dazzling legal 
opinions advocating judicial restraint.163 Alongside the “anti-Barak,” Grosskopf is 
experienced and well-respected in his own right. Given that he was at the top of 
Supreme Court President Esther Hayut’s list, Grosskopf fills the spot of one 
outgoing activist judge. Yet as was true in 2017, this round of appointments made 
the Court more conservative overall, potentially even putting liberals at a six to 
eight disadvantage on some issues.164  
This is not necessarily a bad thing. Indeed, if the Chief Justice was allowed 
to effectively control future appointments, as has largely been the case up until 
quite recently, it seems less likely that the Court would see much diversity in 
background or legal approach. However, the Israeli Supreme Court is one of the 
few reliable guardians of liberal-democratic principles in Israel, and insofar as 
the Court moves markedly toward judicial restraint due increased political 
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involvement in appointments, equality and minority rights are unlikely to win out 
at the expense of the state’s Jewish identity. 
Moreover, there may be additional structural changes that further 
diminish the Court’s influence on the appointments process in the very near 
future. On several occasions, Justice Minister Shaked has threatened to advance 
a proposal allowing permanent appointments with only a simple majority on the 
Selections Committee.165 As I mentioned above, the current seven vote 
requirement has allowed the Court to retain some degree of sway beyond their 
three seats on the Committee. Without it, Shaked would effectively have her pick 
of the litter in future appointments. However, when Shaked threatened to 
advance the bill (perhaps as a negotiation tactic, perhaps not) in 2016, Chief 
Justice Miriam Naor issued a fierce response, issuing a formal letter to the 
Justice Minister that read, in part: 
Submitting this bill at the current time represents...“placing a gun on the 
table”...It means that...the constitutional “rules of the game” will be 
changed...Therefore, I must inform you—with the support of [Court] Vice 
President Rubenstein and Justice [Salim] Joubran—that we have no 
intention to continue at this time with the dialogue...to formulate a list of 
candidates and regarding possible agreements.166 
 
By presenting a unified front, the Committee’s three sitting justices were able to 
call Shaked’s bluff. However, there is no guarantee that the bill will not rear its 
head again in the future. In addition to the structural power she would gain, 
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which future justice ministers would also enjoy, Shaked has already cut a deal 
with the Bar Association in order to allow Yisrael Beytenu MK Robert Ilatov to fill 
the seat of “opposition MK.”167 Ilatov’s views of the Court are quite similar to 
those of the current justice minister, demonstrated by the fact that he submitted 
the same proposal Shaked had threatened in March of 2016, even later joining 
the coalition. In effect, the bill would allow Shaked to take advantage of the fact 
that the Selections Committee has two coalition MKs instead of the traditional 
arrangement, which reserves one seat for an opposition MK.  
Whether it is the proposal I have described above or one that takes a 
different form, politicizing Supreme Court appointments in a nation that is 
otherwise ruled by a unicameral legislature could very well lead to a lasting and 
illiberal tyranny of the majority.168 Israel is unlikely to see a considerably more 
liberal coalition government in the near future. If conservative politicians can 
consistently select justices that will sanction their policies, who will remain to 
protect minority rights in Israel—or liberal-democratic principles more broadly—
especially when they come into conflict with the state’s Jewish identity? The 
consequences of such an arrangement will be swift as well as devastating, and 
they will be felt for years to come. 
As I have demonstrated, a set of underlying socio-political factors have 
contributed to a distinct pattern: in many, though not all, recent high-profile 
                                               
167 Yonah Jeremy Bob, "Shaked, Hayut Battle Over Future of High Court," Jerusalem Post, last 
modified February 21, 2018, accessed April 23, 2018, http://www.jpost.com/Israel-
News/Shaked-Hayut-battle-over-future-of-High-Court-543206.  
168 See Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba 
Winthrop (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2002). 
71 
 
cases, the Court’s decisions have become more moderate (or, depending on one’s 
point of view, more recalcitrant). This move towards restraint is driven, in part, 
by the loss of key justices, the public’s declining trust in the Court, as well as the 
judiciary’s decreased bargaining power relative to both the justice minister and 
the Knesset itself. The following sub-section is situated within this context, and it 
endeavors to uncover the appropriate course of action for the Israeli Supreme 
Court. As I will suggest, judicial restraint is the Court’s best option in all but the 
most egregious cases. However, while this is indeed the national judiciary’s most 
prudent course of action, it will still likely lead Israel to highlight its identity as 
the “Jewish State” at the expense of liberal-democratic principles to which it has 
long been committed. 
 
B. Judicial Activism and Social Change in Rifted Democracies 
 As is clear from the selection of quotes at the beginning of this chapter, the 
proper role of any state’s highest court is an incredibly complex question with no 
universal answer. Of course, the lack of a “silver bullet” solution is characteristic 
of many big political questions; politics is messy, as is constitutionalism. It is, 
however, worth investigating the Israeli Supreme Court’s best course of action 
given the state’s underlying constitutional arrangements and the way they 
interact with present-day circumstances. This section will argue that Israel is best 
described as what Ruth Gavison calls a “rifted democracy,” and as I hope to make 
clear, this makes the model of a pedagogical Supreme Court ill-suited to the 
Israeli polity. This is especially true in the current socio-political climate. In other 
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words, looking to the Court as a “republican schoolmaster” in the Jewish State 
was never particularly likely to succeed, but contemporary perceptions of 
excessive judicial activism have made it even less viable.169 Before explaining why 
the Barak Court was wrong to adopt a pedagogical approach to the Israeli polity, I 
will draw out what this model entails by examining its roots in American 
constitutionalism and constitutional theory.  
The pedagogical Supreme Court involves two primary components: the 
first is the Court’s role in highlighting and promulgating its understanding of 
civic virtue, and the second turns on the Court’s capacity to drive social change. 
To be sure, these components are deeply interrelated, and they are both 
necessary if the Court wishes to engage in tangible civic education. The former, 
which I will discuss first, is hardly an original strategy for liberal democracies 
looking to safeguard their foundational principles—for example, consider Ralph 
Lerner’s famous piece “The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster.”170 First, 
Lerner explores evidence for the claim that the U.S. judiciary acted as “teachers 
to the citizenry” from the very beginning of our nation’s history. In support of this 
claim, he examines evidence that the Founders who thought most coherently 
about the place of the Supreme Court in the proposed government expected it to 
engage in “high political education.”171 On the question of the Court’s proper role 
in a democratic system of government, Lerner had this to say: 
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An adequate judiciary in a democratic regime must be at once 
upright and subtle...The consequence of so regarding the judge is to 
thrust him—and the whole machinery of justice—into the role of an 
educator, molder, or guardian of those manners, morals, and beliefs 
that sustain republican government.172 
 
This is the core of Lerner’s argument, and as he explains, it raises foundational 
questions about how the Framers expected to sustain and perpetuate a 
republican regime.173 During the Virginia ratification debates, for example, James 
Madison posed the following question to Patrick Henry: “Is there no virtue 
among us? If there be not, we are in a wretched situation. No theoretical checks, 
no form of government, can render us secure.”174 It appears that Madison 
believed the American polity needed at least a foundational basis in moral purity. 
However, in attempting to secure the republican form of government for 
posterity, the Founders did not blindly rely on the virtue of the people; it was 
necessary but not sufficient to this long-term goal.  
Those who attended the Philadelphia Convention repeatedly discussed 
adopting a “Council of Revision” which, if codified, would have granted the 
executive and several members of the national judiciary a qualified veto over 
every act of the legislature.175 This idea was successfully challenged on the basis 
that “judges should do—and only do—what they are trained for.”176 But instead of 
allowing this objection to undercut the necessity of safeguarding “the legal and 
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political principles of the regime,” Lerner deftly utilizes this logic to reach a more 
nuanced conclusion. He claims that the very characteristics of the judiciary which 
Hamilton described in Federalist No. 78 make the courts uniquely suited to 
perform this safeguarding function. The strength of Lerner’s argument arises 
from the fact that he envisioned the judges acting indirectly as “faithful 
sustainers and guardians of the regime”—that is, only when the regime’s 
principles were implicated in a specific judicial case.177 Of course, this fits very 
nicely with the Justiciability Doctrine, and bounding the Court in this way has 
certainly gone a long way towards ensuring that the American Supreme Court 
retains broad public confidence, a necessary factor for it to act as a “republican 
schoolmaster.” 
 However, although this argument for a pedagogical Court is quite 
powerful, it is not foolproof. While the American constitutional framework seeks 
to insulate the Court from public opinion, the justices are not wholly detached 
from the nation’s political reality. In Jacobsohn’s words: 
The power to restrain the majority through the exercise of judicial 
review presupposes the existence of a moral consensus that is 
embodied in a constitution…[The] legitimacy [of judicial review] 
inheres in its furtherance of those ideas that nourish the American 
conception of nationhood… [Therein] lies a critical, perhaps the 
critical difference with the Israeli constitutional scene, in which the 
source of interpretive disagreement over the first principles is itself 
foundational.”178 
 
Here we have a natural segue to Ruth Gavison’s discussion about “The Role of 
Courts in Rifted Democracies” such as Israel. In these societies, if the Court 
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hopes to retain public confidence, it should be somewhat more reluctant to 
engage in judicial activism. As she puts it, “The role of the courts in democracy is 
not just one of jurisprudence or an analysis of the concepts of ‘democracy’ and 
‘court’. It is a normative-political question.”179 While normative considerations 
should be the courts’ preeminent concern, within rifted democracies in 
particular, the judiciary should avoid determining specific arrangements and 
priorities, especially in areas of social controversy where the grounds of judicial 
activism remain nebulous.180 The paradigmatic example of this sort of 
controversy might be the fundamental tension in Israeli society between Israel as 
a Jewish state and a liberal democratic one.  
 More generally, the prevailing political landscape lies at the heart of a 
national judiciary’s ability to drive social change, and while this does not strictly 
include public opinion, the views of the state’s citizens are an important 
determinant of the Court’s success in this realm. As is often the case, Tocqueville 
may have put it best: 
The power of the Supreme Court Justices is immense, but it is 
power springing from opinion. They are all-powerful so long as the 
people consent to obey the law; they can do nothing when they 
scorn it...The federal judges therefore must not only be good 
citizens and men of education and integrity, qualities necessary for 
all magistrates, but must also be statesmen; they must know how to 
understand the spirit of the age, to confront those obstacles that can 
be overcome, and to steer out of the current when the tide threatens 
to carry them away, and with them the sovereignty of the Union and 
obedience to its laws.181 
 
                                               
179 Ruth Gavison, "The Role of Courts in Rifted Democracies," Israel Law Review 33, no. 2 (April 
1999): [218]. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, [137]. 
76 
 
The image in this final clause is both eloquent and powerful, and as I will 
explain shortly, it captures a great deal of the contemporary situation in 
Israel. The Israeli Supreme Court is, in a significant sense, attempting to 
steer out of an almost overwhelming current—a political landscape that aims 
to prioritize the state’s Jewish identity while paying little heed to its liberal-
democratic principles. Before making this argument, however, it is 
important to consider whether judges can consistently and reliably drive 
social change. Moreover, I will attempt to elucidate the conditions under 
which the Courts are better able to do so.  
In “The Hollow Hope,” Gerald N. Rosenberg explores the American 
Supreme Court’s ability to bring about social change. This is a complex 
problem to say the least, because as he puts it, “We Americans want courts 
to protect minorities and defend liberties, and to defer to elected officials.” 
For Rosenberg, this means the American political system must carve out a 
space between what he calls the “Dynamic Court” and the “Constrained 
Court.”182  
By concentrating on social reform litigation in the spheres of civil rights, 
abortion, and women’s rights, Rosenberg relies heavily on empirical data to 
determine what conditions are most conducive to the courts driving political and 
social change with a nationwide impact—“significant” reform such as Brown and 
Roe183—and in the end, he comes to an interesting conclusion. In discussing both 
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the “judicial path” and the “extra-judicial path” of social reform through Court 
decisions, Rosenberg’s book contends that due to the constraints on judicial 
efficacy, courts are generally ineffective in driving major social change. Moreover, 
he focuses on the U.S. Supreme Court, which, compared to its Israeli counterpart, 
appears far better suited to this task, given our agreement on our nation’s 
political fundamentals.184 Thus, while Rosenberg does not specifically take up the 
Israeli case, one can extrapolate that this rifted Supreme Court is at least as 
unlikely to create social change as its American counterpart—and likely more so. 
In Lerner’s words, “That problem—the proper connection between judicial power 
and public opinion—remains live and urgent, if mocking of final formulations.”185 
The late Robert Bork once claimed that Chief Justice Barak’s Court was 
“the most activist, antidemocratic court in the world and... may, unless a merciful 
providence intervenes, foreshadow the future of all constitutional courts in the 
Western world.”186 Of course, this is somewhat hyperbolic; in fact, from 1995-
2016, the Israeli Supreme Court rejected 86.9% of constitutional petitions against 
the government.187 Nevertheless, as I mentioned earlier, the Court receives a 
large number of these petitions each year, and the core of Bork’s assertion 
comports with Gavison’s account of rifted democracies. Even if public 
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perceptions did not fully comport with the empirical reality, what matters is the 
political landscape combined with the fact that activism is especially difficult in 
societies that have yet to resolve foundational constitutional questions.188 These 
factors are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. In short, even overreach based 
on defending (one of) a regime’s fundamental principles may powerfully 
undermine the standing of the national judiciary, which will in turn cripple the 
Court’s capacity to safeguard those very principles in the future. While Chief 
Justice Barak helped establish judicial review as a powerful way to protect 
liberal-democratic principles, I also believe it is fair to say that his “constitutional 
revolution” is partially responsible for the widespread and dangerous criticism 
leveled against the Court, as well as the festering distrust in the judiciary.189 If 
Barak was indeed the state’s republican schoolmaster, his students have offered 
some vigorous pushback. 
In turn, the Court has begun issuing considerably more moderate rulings 
in recent years, resisting activism in several recent cases where the government 
was clearly violating crucial liberal-democratic principles. On some occasions, the 
justices are forced to adopt somewhat tortured legal logic in order to protect their 
broad powers of judicial review, which the justices, even the most conservative 
jurists among them, almost universally maintain. As former Justice Minister 
Daniel Friedmann puts it: 
From the Supreme Court’s point of view, the situation is a sensitive 
one...It has to walk a fine line between the principles it proclaims 
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and the fear that rulings that elected officials and the public fiercely 
oppose may impel the Knesset to pull the rug out from under [it].190 
 
This final clause is particularly important. Because the Court bases its power on 
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, the constitutional basis for judicial 
review in contemporary Israel can be easily revoked by a simple plurality vote to 
amend this legislation in the Knesset.191 One of the only reasons the Israeli 
Parliament has not gutted the national judiciary is the Court’s recent trend of 
restraint, in addition to the government’s increased power in appointments and 
the fact that doing so would undermine the appearance of a framework based on 
the separation of powers. Politicians do care about appearances, and if the 
Court’s constitutional authority were revoked, the Israeli political structure would 
lose any semblance of a mechanism for counteracting the state’s illiberal and 
undemocratic tendencies.  
 
 
Chapter 4: Examining the Evidence for Judicial Restraint 
 
 In my final chapter, I will examine a few recent cases that powerfully 
demonstrate the Court’s contemporary shift toward judicial restraint. While I will 
spend most of this chapter discussing one case study—namely, land allocation—
through an analysis of the “Admissions Committee Law” as well as two Supreme 
Court cases, I will conclude by briefly broadening my scope. In this final 
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subsection I will suggest that although the Court’s protection of African refugees 
constitutes one potential exception, the recent trend of increased judicial 
restraint has powerfully undermined liberal-democratic principles in several 
other important contexts. These include the Court’s 2011 decision to uphold the 
“Nakba Law,” its 2012 decision to uphold the law prohibiting family 
reunification, and its 2015 decision to uphold most parts of the “Boycott Law.” 
 
A. State-Sanctioned Discrimination and Segregation in the Allocation of Land 
Although I have already discussed it quite extensively in chapter 2, the 
nation-state bill also serves as a useful point of departure for discussing land 
allocation in Israel. Specifically, the piece I am concerned with is found in Article 
IX of the original version: “The State may permit a community, including the 
members of a single religion or the members of a single nationality, to establish 
separate community settlements.”192 This provision is an almost explicit response 
to a landmark Supreme Court case entitled Ka’adan v. Israel Lands 
Administration (2000), which dealt with discrimination in land allocation as well 
as state-sanctioned segregation.  
The petitioners, Adel and Iman Ka’adan, were two Arab Israeli citizens 
who wanted to move from their impoverished village in the Lower Galilee to the 
prosperous settlement of Katzir two kilometers up the hill, in hopes of granting 
their two daughters access to an adequate education system and, more generally, 
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a better life.193 However, the Ka’adans’ request to build a home was immediately 
denied by the Katzir Cooperative Society because they were Arabs, and the 
settlement—built by the Jewish Agency for Israel—was for Jews only.194 A few 
months later, the Ka’adans enlisted the help of the Association for Civil Rights in 
Israel (ACRI). Because the land had been initially allocated by the Israel Lands 
Administration, a state institution that owns 93% of the land in Israel, the 
Ka’adans argued that the decision was discriminatory and unlawful.195 ACRI 
approached the Tel-Eron Local Council—the local committee which managed the 
Katzir Communal Settlement—on behalf of the Ka’adans, and when the family 
was denied recourse, ACRI filed a complaint with the Minister of Construction 
and Housing as well as the Director of the Israeli Lands Administration.196 
Finally, after receiving no response to these complaints, ACRI petitioned the 
Supreme Court to mandate that the Katzir Cooperative Society grant the 
Ka’adans’ request.197 
The Ka’adan controversy began in April 1995, and it took almost five years 
of appeals, hearings, and Supreme Court equivocation198 before the Court issued 
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a decision. Four of the five sitting justices sided with the petitioners. Writing for 
the Court, Chief Justice Barak held that, “Every authority in Israel—and first and 
foremost the government, its authorities and employees—is required to treat all 
individuals in the State equally.”199 According to Barak, equality is implicit in 
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty; although the quasi-constitutional 
legislation never explicitly mentions the word, throughout, it speaks of rights that 
are universal to “every Israeli citizen” or “every human being.”200 Indeed, this is 
quite a strong textual argument. Moreover Chief Justice Barak asserted that 
equality was a “basic constitutional principle” in Israel’s political scheme, citing 
the state’s Declaration of Independence and its guarantee of complete equality 
regarding social and political rights. Naturally, this understanding would 
preclude the kind of discrimination at issue in Ka’adan.  
Moreover, in this landmark decision, Chief Justice Barak explicitly cited 
several international human rights declarations and conventions as well as the 
holding in Brown v. Board of Education that “‘separate but equal’ policy is 
‘inherently unequal.’”201 However, in qualifying his reference to the famous 
American desegregation case, Chief Justice Barak added an important caveat, 
writing, “Occasionally, separate treatment may be considered equal, or in the 
alternative...separate treatment may be justified, despite the violation of 
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equality.”202 In drawing this out, he pointed to Avitan v. Israel Land 
Administration, a case when the Court upheld the ILA’s decision to lease land 
exclusively to Bedouins as they transitioned to permanent housing. This was 
done in order to prevent “forced assimilation” by preserving the Bedouins’ way of 
life and thus their identity as a specific cultural group.203  
In Barak’s view, two factors distinguished the Avitan case from Ka’adan. 
First, he asserted that the result of the ILA’s separation policy in the latter case 
was not benevolent but discriminatory; as Barak writes, “In actuality, the State of 
Israel only allocates land for Jewish communal settlements...[the ILA policy] 
today, in practice, grants Arabs treatment that is separate but not equal.”204 
Second, Barak demonstrated that this segregation was not protecting a distinct 
cultural entity as it was in Avitan. Whereas Bedouins can be said to share a 
nomadic way of life, the fact that “any Jew in Israel” can live in Katzir makes the 
case fundamentally different. As Barak puts it, “No defining feature characterizes 
the residents of the settlement, with the exception of their nationality, which, in 
the circumstances before us, is a discriminatory criterion.”205 To summarize this 
second point: in Ka’adan, the respondents’ desire to preserve a space for “Jews” 
in Katzir was not specific enough.  
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Using this amalgamation of legal reasoning, on March 8th in the year 
2000, the Barak Court ruled that “that the State was not permitted, by law, to 
allocate state land to the Jewish Agency, for the purpose of establishing the 
communal settlement of Katzir on the basis of discrimination between Jews and 
non-Jews.”206 Chief Justice Barak was careful to emphasize that they state could 
not discriminate directly or indirectly, which seemingly added weight to his 
pronouncement. At the time it was handed down, some saw the Ka’adan decision 
as a monumental step forward for minority groups that had long been denied 
equal treatment by the state; as the ACRI’s Dan Yakir put it, ''This is the most 
important ruling in the history of the Supreme Court on the issue of equal rights 
for Arab citizens of Israel, and it is a big step forward in the struggle for full 
equality.” Naturally, others saw it as the beginning of the end for the Jewish 
State. However, a closer reading of the decision itself uncovers several crucial 
qualifications that powerfully detract from the case’s “revolutionary” credentials.  
In this respect, it is telling that the Court sought to “reach an appropriate 
balance” in issuing its decision, weighing their principled assertion of equality 
under the law against the costs that would be incurred by the Jewish Agency, the 
Katzir Cooperative Society, and the settlement’s Jewish residents, should the 
Court grant the petitioners’ request. If the Court is asserting that discrimination 
in land allocation is based on faulty legal reasoning and is thus unlawful, the cost 
of correcting course should not be relevant. The Court’s next qualification follows 
from this, and it is perhaps the most obvious: immediately after the quote 
                                               
206 Ibid. 
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provided above, the Barak Court merely mandated that the state consider the 
petitioners’ request “on the basis of the principle of equality, and...factors 
relevant to the matter.”207 By requiring so little, the Court’s new constitutional 
jurisprudence was rendered toothless by the Court itself.208 
Beyond the “landmark” decision’s tepid legal pronouncement, there was 
little in the way of substantive change. Eventually the Ka’adans received a formal, 
vaguely-worded rejection from the Katzir admissions committee, which justified 
this decision based on the notion that it would be difficult for them to integrate 
into the community’s social scene.209 Even more striking than the Ka’adans’ 
rejection is what came next: an internal document surfaced in September of 
2003, revealing that the Jewish Agency for Israel had simply decided to ignore 
the Ka’adan decision and quietly return to the status quo. Written in July 2000, 
the document stated that, seeing as Barak’s ruling closed any legal loopholes, the 
agency would instead try “not to make any noise in the system, and continue to 
do what we have been doing.”210 In light of these two developments, the Ka’adans 
                                               
207 See Ka’adan v. Israel Land Administration. 
208 It should also be noted that the Court ruled that the petition was “forward-looking,” meaning 
the Court would ignore past discrimination in the allocation of land by the state. Of course, this 
element of the Court’s decision may also have been a simple acknowledgement of limitations 
within the 1992 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. As Article 10 stipulates, “This Basic Law 
shall not affect the validity of any law that existed prior to the inception of the Basic Law.” Again, 
see the unofficial english translation on the Knesset’s website 
http://knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/BasicLawLiberty.pdf  
209 Of course, worries about the social tensions caused by desegregation would hardly make the 
Warren Court reconsider their decision in Brown. It was in spite of this backlash (which was 
likely much more violent than what would have happened in Katzir) that the Court saw fit to 
declare a constitutional principle and demand its immediate enforcement. This is part of what 
made it a transformative moment in American history. 
210 See Mazie, “Israel’s Higher Law,” [237]. 
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and ACRI again petitioned the Supreme Court, asking that the ILA be forced to 
offer the Arab-Israeli family a plot a land in Katzir at 1995 prices.  
The ILA negotiated a compromise with the Ka’adans before the Court was 
able to rule on this petition, and by late-2007, Adel Ka’adan finally began 
building a house on the land he bought in Katzir.211 After much bureaucratic foot-
dragging212 and political backlash powerful enough to make it into international 
news,213 the Ka’adans had won their decade-long legal battle. Understandably, 
many saw this as a watershed moment for equality in Israel. But this is not where 
the story ends.  
In March of 2011, the Knesset enacted Amendment No. 8 of the 
Cooperative Societies Ordinance, or, as it is more often called, the Admissions 
Committees Law. This legislation allows small communities located on state 
lands in The Negev or Galilee to screen new residents, granting admission 
committees like the one in Katzir nearly full discretion in determining who is 
allowed to reside in their communities. Specifically, the Law applies to 434 small 
communities in Israel, which collectively make up 43% of all residential areas in 
the state.214 Supporters of the Admissions Committee Law often highlight clause 
6C(C), which prohibits the rejection of a candidate “for reasons of race, religion, 
                                               
211 Hila Raz, "Of Little People and Landmark Decisions," Haaretz, last modified November 27, 
2008, accessed April 23, 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/1.5066206.   
212 Tom Segev, "A Decade of Dreams Down the Drain," Haaretz, last modified September 29, 
2005, accessed April 23, 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/1.4876246.  
213 See http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2002-07-10/news/0207100326_1_adel-kaadan-arab-
galilee-jewish-state and https://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/15/world/israel-backs-off-bill-to-
curb-arab-home-buying.html  
214 "Israeli Supreme Court upholds 'Admissions Committees Law' that allows Israeli Jewish 
communities to exclude Palestinian Arab citizens," last modified September 17, 2014, accessed 
April 23, 2018, https://www.adalah.org/en/content/view/8327. 
87 
 
gender, nationality, disability, personal status, age, parenthood, sexual 
orientation, country of origin, political-party opinion or affiliation.”215  
These protections would certainly be comforting from a liberal-democratic 
point of view, if not for the fact that they must be understood within the context 
of the Law as a whole. Indeed, section 6C(A) provides alarmingly vague reasons 
for justifiable exclusion, stipulating that admissions committees are entitled to 
reject candidates who do not fit into “the social-cultural fabric” or are “not 
suitable for the social life of the community.”216 This ambiguity openly invites 
admissions committees to interpret the clause as they please, despite the fact that 
these same bodies had long been engaged in explicit discrimination.217 Below, in 
my analysis of the Court’s 2014 decision on this Law, I will explain why this is 
problematic from a liberal-democratic point of view. For now, suffice it to say 
that the Admission Committees Law lays the legal groundwork for “Jews-only” 
settlements in the Negev Desert and the Lower Galilee218 while merely paying lip-
service to liberal-democratic principles. The Law’s “anti-discrimination” clause in 
                                               
215 See  "Law to Amend the Cooperative Societies Ordinance (No. 8), 5771-2011," accessed April 
23, 2018, 
https://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/upfiles/2011/discriminatory_laws_2011/Admissions_
Committees_Law_2011_English.pdf for Adalah’s full English translation of the Law. 
216 See section 6C(A)4 and 6C(A)5 of the Admissions Committees Law of Ibid. 
217 In fact, an expert on Israel history told me that the language I quoted above is used fairly often 
in Israeli parlance, and the same words may have been used in order to engender discrimination 
in other instances.  
218 The Lower Galilee is a majority-Arab region of Israel with sizeable Druze and Bedouin 
populations, and this fact is not lost on the Jewish-Israelis forming these communities. Indeed, it 
is long-standing government policy to encourage migration to this part of the country in order 
increase the region’s Jewish population—in fact, there is even a popular term for this 
phenomenon: the “Judaization of the Galilee.” See Gazhi Falah, "Israeli 'Judaization' Policy in 
Galilee," Jstor, last modified 1991, accessed April 23, 2018, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2537436.pdf?refreqid=excelsior:845274330d06b5cc7349b958
59884473.). For a demographic breakdown by region, see 1. "CBS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF 
ISRAEL 2013," accessed April 23, 2018, http://www.cbs.gov.il/shnaton64/st02_17.pdf..  
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6C(C) is a thinly veiled attempt to create the appearance of respect for minority 
rights, while carving out a space for discrimination that, when it occurs, is near-
impossible to prove.  
After all, what does it mean to be “incompatible” with a community’s 
social-cultural fabric? The 2011 Law doesn’t ask for much specificity beyond the 
committee’s subjective determination. Much like the Jewish Association for 
Israel did almost a decade earlier, admissions committees could return to 
business as usual. However, the Admissions Committees Law is different in one 
important way: instead of maintaining the de facto status quo, it allows de jure 
discrimination.219 In practical terms, this means that 43% of Israeli land is 
inaccessible to the state’s minority Arab population. Making Arab-Israelis 
second-class citizens in this context is state-sanctioned. Indeed, it is the result of 
legislation by the Israeli government, though the vague conditions for rejection 
make it a seemingly indirect form of systematic exclusion. 
 Both Adalah and ACRI submitted petitions to the Court, asking the 
judiciary to strike down the Law on the basis that it sanctions discrimination and 
is thus unconstitutional. The Court convened an expanded panel of nine Supreme 
Court justices to discuss the case, ultimately issuing a decision in Uri Sabah v. 
The Knesset (2014). In a 5-4 split, the Court dismissed the petitions, stating, “We 
cannot determine at this stage whether the law violates constitutional rights.” 
While the dissenting opinions ultimately prove most convincing, the judicial 
                                               
219 Admittedly, the de jure sanction of discrimination requires manipulating the legal language 
through interpretation, but the fact remains that what was previously de facto policy now has a 
basis in the law. 
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reasoning in the case as a whole helps illuminate some important dynamics at 
play in the contemporary Israeli Supreme Court. 
In his majority opinion, Chief Justice A. Grunis’s legal reasoning relied 
heavily upon “the ripeness doctrine,” which had been introduced into Israeli 
constitutional law just three years earlier in Alumni Association of the Arab 
Orthodox School in Haifa v. Minister of Finance (2011).220 One should note that 
Grunis insisted that his use of the ripeness doctrine was not an “avoidance 
technique” for skirting adjudication on important constitutional questions.221 On 
his view, when it is unclear how the law will be applied in practice, and when no 
administrative decision has been made on the basis of the law under review or 
when there are no petitioners that have been directly affected by it, the ripeness 
doctrine justifies the rejection of a petition. In this vein, when applying this 
doctrine to the Israeli justice system the Chief Justice outlined two more formal 
criteria for its exercise. First, the Court must determine whether it was presented 
with a sufficient factual foundation for ruling on the questions raised by the 
constitutional petition in question. As part of this initial screening process,222 the 
Court should consider whether any petitioners have been directly impacted by 
                                               
220 As I will explain later in this chapter, the Alumni Association case upheld the constitutionality 
of the “Nakba Law” on this basis. For detail on the ripeness doctrine in Israeli jurisprudence, see 
Justice Hanan Melcer’s majority opinion in Uri Avneri v. The Knesset (2015), another case I will 
briefly discuss below. 
221 Unfortunately, an English translation of the full decision is not available at this time. For this 
reason, I have decided to rely upon the Court’s official summary of the ruling, translated from the 
original Hebrew to English by Adalah. See "The Supreme Court of Israel HCJ 2311/11, 2504/11 
Sabah v. The Knesset." Accessed April 23, 2018.  
     
https://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/Public/files/English/Legal_Advocacy/Petitions/2014/  
     SCT-Admissions-Committees-Decision-Eng-Summary-Sept-2014.pdf.  
 
222 Pun intended. 
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the law, and it should also evaluate to what extent a particular law’s 
implementation is necessary for judging is constitutionality.  
The second criterion is essentially an exception to the requirement of 
sufficient factual basis; in other words, the Court should determine whether there 
are other reasons for adjudicating the petition before the law is implemented.223 
Chief Justice Grunis called this the “chilling effect” exception, an explicit 
reference to an element of American Supreme Court jurisprudence that is most 
often invoked first amendment cases, but which has also been used to protect 
other constitutionally-protected individual rights in the United States.224 In the 
context of Sabah, this meant determining whether the law’s very existence would 
discourage Arabs from even attempting to gain entry into an otherwise 
exclusively Jewish community. 
The roots225 of the ripeness doctrine itself can also be traced back to the 
U.S. Supreme Court. Although the doctrine had been loosely applied to 
“administrative determinations” before Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner (1967), 
“ripeness” became a clearly outlined element of Supreme Court jurisprudence in 
Abbott.226 In its decision, the Court fashioned a two-part test for determining 
                                               
223 See "The Supreme Court of Israel HCJ 2311/11, 2504/11 Sabah v. The Knesset." Accessed April 
23, 2018. 
https://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/Public/files/English/Legal_Advocacy/Petitions/2014/  
     SCT-Admissions-Committees-Decision-Eng-Summary-Sept-2014.pdf.  
224 The “chilling effect” was first referenced in a constitutional context by Justice Felix Frankfurter 
in Wieman v. Updegraff (1952). See “The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law” 
225 Pun also intended. 
226 For more reading on the early history of the ripeness doctrine, I will suggest the same work 
Justice Harlan pointed to: See 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, c. 21 (1958) and Jaffe 
Judicial Control of Administrative Action, c. 10 (1965) 
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ripeness challenges to federal regulation, and it appears quite similar to Chief 
Justice Grunis’ two criteria. As Justice Harlan wrote in his majority opinion:  
Without undertaking to survey the intricacies of the ripeness 
doctrine it is fair to say that its basic rationale is to prevent the 
courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from 
entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over 
administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from 
judicial interference until an administrative decision has been 
formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging 
parties. The problem is best seen in a twofold aspect, requiring us to 
evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the 
hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.227 
 
Of course, in the United States, not only does one need legal standing in order to 
bring a case before the Court, but cases that lie outside Article III’s narrow 
boundaries for original jurisdiction must rise through the appellate process.228 
However, the above-described concern with “premature adjudication” is clearly 
analogous to one of Chief Justice Grunis’ arguments for dismissing petitions 
against the Admissions Committees Law; both petitions were submitted just days 
after the legislation was initially passed, meaning they did not (and could not) 
include sufficient evidence of harm caused by the Law. Proof of a hidden 
                                               
227 See full decision at "Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967)." Accessed April 23, 
2018.  
     https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/387/136/case.html.   
228 U.S. Constitution, Article III, Section 2: “The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and 
equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under their authority;—to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers 
and consuls;—to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;—to controversies to which the 
United States shall be a party;—to controversies between two or more states;—between a state 
and citizens of another state;—between citizens of different states;—between citizens of the same 
state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, 
and foreign states, citizens or subjects...In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers 
and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original 
jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate 
jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the 
Congress shall make.” 
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mechanism of discrimination would be possible only after the legislation was 
implemented.229 Absent this factual foundation, the Chief Justice refused to rule 
on the constitutionality of the Admissions Committees Law, in order to avoid 
“entangling” the Court in adjudication regarding abstract or hypothetical 
discrimination.230 While Chief Justice Grunis emphasized that rejecting the 
petition did not signal an expression of the Court’s opinion vis-a-vis the law’s 
constitutionality, the effect of their decision meant that the Law would be upheld, 
at least for the time being.231 
 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Salim Joubran challenged the Chief 
Justice’s conclusion largely on the basis that he had mischaracterized the case’s 
factual foundation. Without directly challenging the “ripeness doctrine” or its two 
criteria, Justice Joubran ultimately asserted that sections 6C(A)(4) and 6C(A)(5), 
the extremely vague provisions allowing for exclusion, should be revoked.232 After 
                                               
229 See "The Supreme Court of Israel HCJ 2311/11, 2504/11 Sabah v. The Knesset." Accessed April 
23, 2018. 
https://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/Public/files/English/Legal_Advocacy/Petitions/2014/  
     SCT-Admissions-Committees-Decision-Eng-Summary-Sept-2014.pdf. (page 2). 
230 In American constitutional law, there are important disagreements about how the “ripeness” 
test should be applied to determining a case’s justiciability, and these arguments are in turn based 
on differing understandings of the Court’s jurisdiction under Article III. See Gene R. Nichol 
Jr.’sGene R. Nichol, Jr, "Ripeness and the Constitution," accessed April 23, 2018, 
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4503&context=uclrev. for an 
interesting discussion of the Burger Court’s approach to this question. This paper also 
demonstrates the evolution of the Court’s own understanding of its purview from assessing 
whether a litigant’s “legal interest” is protected by law or by the Constitution; to a constitutional 
standard of “injury in fact” which “in no way depends” on the substantive issues litigated; to 
requiring at “an irreducible minimum...actual or threatened injury” for judiciability. For the 
reader who is short on time, the legal language I have just quoted is from Joint Anti-Fascist 
Refugee Committee v. McGrath (1951); Association of Data Processing v. Camp (1970); and 
Valley Forge v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State (1982), respectively. 
231 See "The Supreme Court of Israel HCJ 2311/11, 2504/11 Sabah v. The Knesset." Accessed April 
23, 2018. 
https://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/Public/files/English/Legal_Advocacy/Petitions/2014/  
     SCT-Admissions-Committees-Decision-Eng-Summary-Sept-2014.pdf.  (page 2) 
232 See Ibid (page 3). 
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recognizing that admissions committees could be justified in theory, Joubran 
began by asserting that the legal barriers built by these particular committees are 
built on disputed ground. This, he said, should inform the basis for legitimate 
exclusion on this land.  
Moreover, he asserted that the admissions committees should be viewed 
within their historical context. For many years, both before and after Ka’adan, 
allowing these committees to exercise their discretion in fact created a hidden 
mechanism that both anchors and perpetuates a pre-existing discriminatory 
reality.233 In this vein, Justice Joubran challenged the Chief Justice’s application 
of the “ripeness doctrine,” on the basis that the Admissions Committees Law does 
not present something new.234 Attorney Bishara, one of Adalah’s lawyers, put it 
well: “The law is functioning the same way it did previously as a policy, 
deterring...especially Palestinian Arab citizens of the state from applying for 
housing in these towns for fear of rejection.”235 In other words, the Court already 
had the necessary evidence it needed to rule on whether this legislation would be 
discriminatory. And as I suggested above—based on a careful analysis of the Law 
itself—the oversight mechanisms that were ostensibly aimed at preventing 
discrimination would almost certainly prove insufficient. If this is true, the 
                                               
233 See Suzie Navot’s “The Constitution of Israel: A Contextual Analysis” (p. 244) 
234 See "The Supreme Court of Israel HCJ 2311/11, 2504/11 Sabah v. The Knesset,"  (page 2-3) 
235 See "Israeli Supreme Court upholds 'Admissions Committees Law' that allows Israeli Jewish 
communities to exclude Palestinian Arab citizens," last modified September 17, 2014, accessed 
April 23, 2018, https://www.adalah.org/en/content/view/8327. 
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decision should be reversed on the basis of the “chilling effect” cited by the Chief 
Justice himself.236 
However, due in part to the Court’s ruling, the Admissions Committees 
Law will result in the protection and promulgation of Israel’s Jewish identity in 
these communities. As I have demonstrated above, the Law does so at the 
expense of liberal-democratic principles—in this case, primarily freedom of 
movement, equality, and freedom from discrimination. However, the Sabah 
decision will create other important ripple effects. With respect to the evolution 
of Israeli constitutionalism, one should return to the Chief Justice’s legal 
reasoning: the “ripeness doctrine” itself. As anybody who decries the Court’s 
rampant activism will tell you, the doctrinal judicial restraint implicit in assessing 
“ripeness” is practically unheard of in the Court’s modern history.  
Returning to my point of departure, recall the provision of the nation-state 
bill which has survived in substance, if not in exact language, since it was written 
in Article IX of the original version: “The State may permit a community, 
including the members of a single religion or the members of a single nationality, 
to establish separate community settlements.”237 The future Basic Law will 
remove all doubt, if any remains, that the Israeli government can lawfully 
discriminate in allocating land on the basis of religion, ethnicity, or any number 
                                               
236 In other words, if Arab-Israelis were not attempting to gain entry into all-Jewish communities 
because they were near-certain that those evaluating their applications could now legally turn 
them down on the basis of their religion or nationality—as they had long-done in practice—this 
would constitute a “chilling effect” on the very action that is necessary to trigger evidence of 
discrimination under this new Law. 
237 "Basic Law: The National Home." Accessed April 23, 2018. 
http://www.justice.gov.il/StateIdentity/InformationInEnglish/Documents/BasicLawBill.pdf. 
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of other factors. As Justice Minister Shaked recently put it, one “purpose of the 
nation-state bill” is to prevent “a ruling like the one in the Ka’adan case in 
2000.”238  
The legislation flies in the face of Chief Justice Barak’s liberal-democratic 
understanding of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, eviscerating an already 
thoroughly de-fanged legal precedent. After the Knesset has granted the 
Admissions Committees Law (and future laws like it) quasi-constitutional status, 
the Court will have quite a difficult time overturning Sabah, even if a petitioner 
brought precisely the post-2011 evidence Chief Justice Grunis deemed necessary 
to establish a factual foundation of discrimination. Under the pretext of 
“preserving culture, heritage, and identity,” the future Basic Law will make the 
above-described state-sanctioned discrimination and segregation effectively 
untouchable. Since the very beginning of the controversy roughly two decades 
ago, the Supreme Court and the Knesset have effectively prioritized Israel’s 
Jewish identity over its liberal-democratic commitments in the context of land 
allocation and segregation. Whatever their intentions, in practice, these 
institutions were acting in concert. 
 
B. Briefly Broadening the Discussion 
  
 To some extent, judicial activism has continued to protect liberal-
democratic principles in one important context: the Knesset’s amendments to the 
                                               
238 Revital Hovel, "Justice Minister: Israel Must Keep Jewish Majority Even at the Expense of 
Human Rights," Haaretz, last modified February 13, 2018, accessed April 23, 2018, 
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/justice-minister-israel-s-jewish-majority-trumps-than-
human-rights-1.5811106.  
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Prevention of Infiltration Act of 1954. In order to address the wave of African 
refugees crossing into Israel through the Sinai Peninsula, the most 
comprehensive set of modifications was passed by the Knesset in 2012. The 
Israeli government disputes the fact that this group of nearly 60,000 people are 
indeed refugees, instead referring to them as “infiltrators.” While this is troubling 
in its own right, the most important constitutional questions have concerned how 
the government has treated this vulnerable population. In September of 2013, the 
Court convened a panel of nine judges and voided most of the amendments, 
including a provision that empowered the state to hold “infiltrators” in custody 
for up to three years without trial. Even after the Knesset passed an alternate 
version which limited the custody period to one year, in addition to several other 
changes, the Court again voided the amendments almost exactly one year after 
the first ruling. Finally, after there were several vocal calls to amend Basic Law: 
Human Dignity and Liberty, the Court upheld most provisions of the Knesset’s 
third set of amendments.239 While the Court’s first two rulings were especially 
encouraging from a liberal-democratic perspective, it is not clear that the 
judiciary will always be able to defend human rights in this manner. 
 The broader trend of judicial restraint makes it appear especially likely 
that these types of judicial protections will be enjoyed only temporarily. With 
respect to the Court’s recent inaction in the face of other powerfully illiberal state 
policies, two cases that I briefly alluded to above prove particularly interesting: 
Alumni Association of the Arab Orthodox School in Haifa v. Minister of Finance 
                                               
239 Friedmann, “Changes in Appointments,” [339-341] 
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(2011) and Uri Avneri v. The Knesset (2015). The former amounts to a judicial 
sanction of the “Nakba Law,” which empowers the Minister of Finance to 
withhold public funding from institutions that either commemorate Israel’s 
Independence Day as an occasion for mourning or hold an event that challenges 
the existence of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. This law clearly violates 
freedom of expression, while also contributing to the erasure of deeply personal 
Palestinian narratives of displacement and expulsion during May of 1948. 240 
In the latter case, the Court largely upheld the “Boycott Law,” which 
stipulates that anybody who knowingly issues a public call to boycott Israel or any 
company associated with the state may be liable to civil suit. The legal reasoning 
in Avneri is particularly troubling: writing for the majority, Justice Melcer 
initially admits it is difficult to dispute that this Law violates the freedom of 
expression, but he later adopts an impoverished, purely formalistic 
understanding of this liberal-democratic principle. When Melcer writes that “a 
boycott silences...discourse,” he refuses to recognize that the boycott itself is 
discourse. Moreover, he claims that calling for or participating in a boycott 
against the State of Israel, even if it is limited to a boycott against Israeli 
settlements, amounts to “political terror.”241 In both cases, there are clear 
indications that the Court’s decisions were at least partially influenced by political 
                                               
240  For an English translation of the full decision, see 
http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/upload/opinions/Alumni%20Association%20of%
20the%20Arab%20Orthodox%20School%20in%20Haifa%20v%20Minister%20of%20Finance.p
df  
241 For an English translation of the full decision, see 
http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/upload/opinions/Avneri%20v.%20Knesset.pdf  
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considerations, which is completely consistent with my discussion in the previous 
chapter. 
*  * * 
 
Earlier in this paper, I argued that the key issues in Israeli 
Constitutionalism have largely stemmed from the lack of clarity regarding which 
of Israel’s two main constitutional principles would win out when they came into 
conflict.242 Indeed, the tug-of-war between liberal-democracy and Israel’s status 
as a Jewish State has practically defined the nation’s constitutional history to this 
point. Yet in the rest of my paper, I hope to have demonstrated why this may not 
remain the case for long. From the nation-state bill’s exclusion of Arab-Israelis 
and its erasure of the Palestinian narrative to contemporary cases and shifting 
dynamics in the Supreme Court, the evidence suggests that Israel may be at the 
start of a fundamental shift which will resolve the state’s foundational 
constitutional tension in favor of its Jewish identity. However, there is no way to 
know for sure. For now, this transformation remains hypothetical, and in Israel, 
the search for constitutional coherence continues.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
242 Jacobsohn, Apple of Gold, [135]. 
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Conclusion: A Transformational Shift? It Could Be 
“To the extent that all branches (and, we might add, citizens) were 
involved in the common enterprise of attempting to realize constitutional 
ideals, they all ha[ve] a responsibility to defend, in appropriate ways, their 
best understanding of these ideals.”243 
- Gary Jacobsohn 
As a result of Israel’s resounding victory in the 1967 War, the state tripled 
the amount of territory under its control, unleashing a nascent sense of messianic 
redemption that remains a part of Israeli national identity. Six years later, the jolt 
of the Yom Kippur War threw all of the state’s institutions into question, 
prompting a period of profound national reflection. When Menachem Begin was 
elected Prime Minister in 1977, his Likud party unseated the secular, left-leaning 
Labour coalition which, having ruled Israel for almost thirty years, previously 
seemed untouchable. The common thread between these events is that each of 
them helped drive a “transformational shift” within the Israeli polity; in different 
ways, all three of them led to fundamental and lasting changes in Israeli society. 
In my final section, I will evaluate whether we may be witnessing the beginning of 
such a transformational moment while further explicating how I understand the 
meaning of that phrase. 
Based on my discussion in chapter 2, one might ask whether the nation-
state bill currently making its way through the Knesset falls into the category of 
“transformational shifts.” Of course, the answer to this question will depend in 
                                               
243 In context, this quote describes Abraham Lincoln’s understanding of the American 
constitutional system, suggesting his deep consideration and profound respect for the separation 
of powers. In keeping with a Madisonian understanding, Lincoln denied that there should be a 
judicial monopoly on constitutional interpretation, and instead, that it was an enterprise for the 
entire polity. In my view, this common enterprise is at the heart of the American constitutional 
project properly understood. See Jacobsohn, Apple of Gold, [132]. 
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part on the implementation of this legislation, as well as subsequent socio-
political developments. However, it may also have a great deal to do with what 
came before the bill’s passage. In other words, based on the factors I listed in 
chapter 3 and chapter 4,244 it is not unreasonable to assert that we may be 
witnessing the beginning of a transformational shift that resolves the 
fundamental tension in Israeli Constitutionalism. To determine whether this is 
indeed the kind of shift I am talking about, one must answer the following 
question: In the coming years, will we see a consistent and pervasive 
prioritization of the state’s Jewish identity over its liberal-democratic principles?  
This question is an enticing one, but its ambiguities must first be more 
closely examined. For some, answering this question in the affirmative implicitly 
requires meeting a certain illiberal or undemocratic threshold. However, as I 
suggested in my introduction, I am not very interested in the formalistic process 
of categorization. I believe it demands that one sacrifice nuance for broad 
applicability, both in the context of initial delineation (which I described in my 
introduction) and in determining whether there is a shift like the one I am 
describing. Beginning with the former, as I alluded to in my introduction, two 
countries can never fully satisfy the same set of “categorization conditions.” This 
is why, after one categorizes the United States as a “Western liberal-democracy,” 
that is not nearly enough information to understand our politics, principles, or 
Madisonian constitutional order. In a similar vein, elucidating Israel’s socio-
political reality and painting a full picture of its constitutional principles are 
                                               
244 And many other factors that I have not discussed. 
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based on state-specific realities. In terms of re-categorizing a state, which 
happens through transformational shifts as I understand them, the same logic 
applies. I intentionally chose somewhat ambiguous language in my framing of a 
transformative shift; predicting whether Israel will “consistently and reliably” 
prioritize its Jewish identity is a better approach than prognosticating regarding 
which criteria are necessary for triggering a more rigid threshold. Labels are not 
particularly useful when dealing with questions as fundamental and nebulous as 
those that arise within the study of evolving civic identity and changing 
constitutional principles.  
So where does this leave us? If we are inevitably forced to blur the lines in 
both categorizing and (if necessary) re-categorizing any given state, why draw 
them in the first place? Where does comparative constitutionalism fit into my 
framing? Properly understood, transformative shifts often involve slow, subtle 
movements along parallel political, social, and legal tracks. I believe the process 
is already underway in Israel, although I cannot state precisely when this 
transformation will occur. I also believe that showing humility in this realm is 
entirely appropriate. However, I do not spurn theoretical categorization 
altogether; we can still analyze whether certain policies, socio-political dynamics, 
and elements of jurisprudence share characteristics of either the liberal-
democracy or ethnocracy ideal type. Yet we must treat these characteristics as 
what they are: disaggregated, theoretical reference points. Between these two 
ideal types is a vast spectrum of gray, and this is where every real liberal-
democracy or ethnocracy lies. By examining a state’s inner workings, we can 
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assess to what extent it satisfies the medley of characteristics on the 
disaggregated theoretical list mentioned above, and in the process, we can learn 
precisely where this state lies on the spectrum I’ve just described.245 This 
certainly seems better than trying to fit a square peg into a round hole. 
Comparative constitutionalism is very well-suited to teasing out this socio-
political nuance, and in fact, I believe that is one of the field’s greatest strengths. I 
hope this is reflected in my arguments above.  Based on the trends I have 
examined, as well as my presentation of Israeli constitutionalism itself, I believe 
these ethnocratic characteristics will continue to manifest more often and in 
different ways during the coming years. Again, this evidence does not tell us 
when a transformative shift will happen, but it does suggest that one might 
already be underway.  
One may argue that definitive Supreme Court jurisprudence could resolve 
this question for the Israeli polity. On this understanding, if the Court clearly 
states that Israel has no obligation to uphold one set of its core constitutional 
principles—whether this takes the form of a single landmark case, or, as is more 
likely, a larger body of jurisprudence—this would in effect settle the theoretical 
tug-of-war that has defined Israeli Constitutionalism to this point. Of course, a 
transformational shift that leaves little to no room for Judaism in Israel is almost 
incomprehensible, implying that this “change” would necessarily involve 
                                               
245 In fact, I have done so in this paper: the violation of human rights, state-sanctioned and 
systematic exclusion, diluting the substance of equality and citizenship, and an ascriptively-based 
“tyranny of the majority” are all components of an ethnocratic society. However, the Israeli polity 
still reflects many aspects of a liberal-democracy as well. Again, my paradigm can accommodate 
all of these state-specific characteristics. 
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abandoning the state’s other core set of commitments—namely, its liberal-
democratic ones.  
To be sure, it appears likely that the Court’s jurisprudence will help 
determine how Israeli society views its foundational constitutional commitments, 
and whether it changes them in the coming years. However, even if the Court 
were somehow granted the formal power to determine constitutional priorities, 
when it settled on any given substantive changes, they would not be immediately 
reflected in Israel’s constitutional foundations. In other words, the process of 
constitutional evolution does not merely turn on Court decisions; it also concerns 
the rest of the polity. Ironic as it may be coming from him, in this vein, one is 
reminded of Chief Justice Barak’s elegant and powerful assertion presented 
above: “The judge is not the only musician within the grand legal orchestra, and 
his playing must be in harmony with the rest of the music.” 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court might be part of this transformational 
shift, if it came to pass. In fact, based on the increasingly intertwined nature of 
politics and legal interpretation in Israel, and the polity’s evolving civic identity, I 
believe that it will. However, given that the shift would involve every part of the 
Israeli polity, one must also look to other would-be defenders of democracy. At 
least initially, it appears as if a few different socio-political developments could 
plausibly prevent this transformational shift. For example, the state-of-affairs 
resulting from cooperation between the Court and the Knesset may at some point 
prove unacceptably undemocratic for many Israelis, leading to the mobilization 
of civil society. After all, the Court is far from the only actor capable of civic 
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education, and liberal-democratic principles can, to some extent, be promulgated 
entirely outside of its purview. In this scenario, artists, activists, and educators 
would unite to push back against the forces driving the above-described 
transformational shift.  
While this is certainly possible, we should remain realistic; public opinion 
polling from 2016 has revealed some sobering figures. As Shibley Telhami 
reported, 79 percent of all Jewish-Israelis said Jews deserve “preferential 
treatment in Israel.”246 Even more alarmingly, 48 percent of all Israeli Jews 
agreed with the statement “Arabs should be expelled or transferred from Israel”—
and this includes a majority of every non-secular Jewish group.247 Nevertheless, if 
there were a major shift in the public’s orientation, one might argue that the 
Court would feel emboldened to revive the interinstitutional conflict248 
characteristic of the Barak Court, challenging the legislature in defense of liberal-
democratic principles. However, it seems much more likely that history will 
repeat itself, with the Knesset once again using political pressure to force the 
Court to back off. As I demonstrated in chapter 3, the Court cannot effectively 
curtail this societal amendment of constitutional principles. Even if united with a 
powerful civil society movement, these groups do not seem very likely to succeed 
in this venture. 
                                               
246 Shibley Telhami, "How Israel's Jewishness Is Overtaking Its Democracy," The Washington 
Post, last modified March 8, 2016, accessed May 11, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/08/how-israels-jewishness-
is-overtaking-its-democracy/?utm_term=.77760465014b. 
247 Ibid. 
248 Asli U. Bali and Hannah Lerner, “Constitution Writing, Religion, and Democracy,” (2017) p. 21 
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Another factor might arise in the socio-political realm that could help 
mitigate the negative impacts of this transformational shift. A major change in 
the conditions that create frictions between various ethnic groups may ease much 
of the tension in Israeli society, even if the state resolves its foundational 
constitutional tension in favor of its Jewish identity. One potential manifestation 
of this would be the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, along with the 
creation of a Palestinian State with broad and legitimate authority. While it is 
technically possible, unfortunately, this scenario also does not seem likely. The 
Conflict’s intractability goes well beyond the difficulty in finding the specific 
provisions that would result in “the deal of all deals.” As a senior Israeli official 
told me in an interview, members of “Israeli society…don’t want to be defined by 
the threats we face, but we have to take those threats seriously.”249 Indeed, 
Israelis and Palestinians are each enmeshed in their own historical narrative, and 
in large part, both groups believe they are the victims and the others are the 
villains. While an assessment of these two national histories is beyond the 
purview of this paper, suffice it to say that they are a fundamental piece of each 
nation’s identity. In other words, Israelis and Palestinians understand themselves 
in relation to the Conflict, and it is unclear what their identities would look like in 
its absence. 
Based on the contemporary state of the Israeli polity, as well as several 
structural factors, neither of these approaches appears likely to succeed in 
                                               
249 Interview with Israeli official, April 16, 2018. 
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mitigating the transformational shift I have described.250 Thus, the constitutional 
question of core principles may well be answered in the coming years. I believe I 
have highlighted several factors that will almost definitely be involved in this 
transformational shift. The most obvious is the presented in chapter 1: the history 
of the Jewish people and their civic bonds will be a key factor in such a shift, and 
the underlying imperative of Zionism, which remains a latent and powerful force 
in some parts of Israeli society, may also prove quite important. My discussion in 
chapter 2 is not as certain to be a direct driver of this transformation. To be sure, 
if Israel indeed resolves its foundational constitutional tension in favor of its 
“Jewishness,” the nation-state bill would certainly be an important part of that 
story; nevertheless, I strongly suspect that when historians speak of this 
transformational shift, if it happens, they will not begin their account in 2018, or 
even 2011, when the future Basic Law was first introduced. Instead, they would 
likely see the legislation as indicative of the socio-political trends and evolving 
constitutional arrangements I discussed in chapters 3 and 4. As they might put it, 
the nation-state Basic Law is nothing but foam atop the wave of policy, Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, and public opinion that has been swelling in this direction 
for at least two decades. 
 
 
                                               
250 Of course, I have only listed the circumstances that I believe are most likely to curtail this shift, 
and I am happy to concede that I may have overlooked some other path towards avoiding it. 
However, if the reader can think of more plausible scenarios, she still must demonstrate why they 
might work better than the extenuating circumstances I have raised. 
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